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1. Introduction
The decision of shareholders of public firms to accept a takeover offer is typically marred by
two problems. First, shareholders generally do not have a precise estimate of the fair value of
their shares, and without more information they cannot distinguish between inadequate and
attractive offers. Second, the takeover succeeds only if the majority of target shareholders
approve it. As noted by Grossman and Hart (1980), unless shareholders can coordinate their
collective decision, there is a free rider problem when shareholders decide whether to accept a
tender offer.1 Overall, there is a risk that the outcome of the takeover is ineffi cient.
To assist target shareholders, the board of directors is expected to use its superior knowledge
about the company and advise shareholders whether accepting the takeover offer is in their best
interests. Indeed, most takeover attempts are accompanied by a public recommendation from
the target board to its shareholders.2 For example, in response to a multi-billion takeover offer
from Kraft Foods, the board of Cadbury published a defence document in which it explains why
shareholders should follow its recommendation to reject Kraft’s offer.3 Target shareholders,
however, do not always follow these recommendations, perhaps because they do not trust their
board. After being pressured by its shareholders, the board of Cadbury eventually accepted
a sweetened bid from Kraft Foods, even though the bid was below what was suggested by
Cadbury’s CEO as a fair value for the company.4 Baker and Savasoglu (2002) study 1901 US
takeover offers between 1981 and 1996, and find that around 20% of the offers either succeeded
despite the resistance of the target board, or failed in spite of the board’s support.5
The evidence suggests that the ability of the target board to sway the collective decision of
its shareholders varies across firms. What determines whether target shareholders listen and
follow the recommendations of their board? Is it necessarily in their best interests to have an
1Rossi and Volpin (2004) find evidence that is consistent with the free-rider hypothesis.
2SEC rule 14d-9 requires the target board to post a recommendation in response to a tender offer in the US.
3See http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/CadburyDefenceDocument2009-part1.pdf
4See “How Cadbury’s resolve melted when the price was right”, The Guardian, 01/18/2010.
5See also Bange and Mazzeo (2004), Cotter and Zenner (1994), Cotter et al. (1997), Schwert (2000),
Shivdasani (1993), Song and Walkling (1993).
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influential board? How does the market react to these recommendations? Does a failure to
influence shareholders’decision indicate that the board had no effect on the outcome of the
takeover? How should corporate boards be structured given their advisory role in takeovers?
The goal of this paper is to explore these important questions, which to best of my knowledge
were overlooked by the existing literature.
For this purpose, I develop a model in which the takeover offer, the recommendation of the
target board, and the collective decision of target shareholders are all determined in equilibrium.
The bidder, who can increase the value of the target, makes a tender offer to acquire the firm.
Once the offer is made, the target board posts a public recommendation to shareholders,
advising them whether to accept or reject the offer. The board is not necessarily maximizing
shareholder value; it may have self-serving motives. However, the board has private information
about the value of the target. By its nature, this information is forward-looking and non-
verifiable. Since the credibility of the board is the key in understanding its ability to influence
the decision of shareholders, communication is modeled as cheap talk à la Crawford and Sobel
(1982). Given the recommendation of the board, each shareholder decides whether to accept
or reject the offer. The takeover is approved if and only if the majority of target shareholders
tender their shares. As in Grossman and Hart (1980), target shareholders cannot coordinate
their collective decision and they are subject to free-riding. If the initial offer is rejected by
shareholders, the bidder can revise it and make a “best and final offer”. Target shareholders
then make their final decision about the takeover.
In equilibrium, there is an interplay between the takeover premium that is offered by the
bidder and the ability of the target board to influence the decision of shareholders. If the
premium is suffi ciently high (too low), the recommendation from the board is uninformative
and target shareholders accept (reject) the offer even if it is against their board’s will. If
the premium is “moderate”, the success of the takeover is uncertain and depends on the
board’s recommendation, which is informative. Building on this characterization, the analysis
provides novel predictions with respect to the likelihood that target shareholders ignore the
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recommendations of their board and the reaction of the market to these recommendations. The
analysis ties these variables to the type of the recommendation (accept or reject) and various
characteristics of the bidding firm (e.g., empire building motives or the ability to make a “best
and final offer”), the independence and industry related expertise of target board members, and
the uncertainty about the value of target (e.g., target stock price informativeness or analysts
coverage).
Seemingly, if in equilibrium the recommendation is uninformative and ignored by sharehold-
ers, the target board must have had no effect on the takeover. The analysis suggests otherwise.
The threat that the target board would alert its shareholders that an offer is inadequate can
in and of itself change the outcome of the takeover and deter the bidder from making a low
offer. For example, if the bidder has significant private benefits of control, he would be willing
to bid up the price to a point where in equilibrium target shareholders accept the offer even if
the board recommends them otherwise. In this light, the decision of Cadbury shareholders to
accept the offer from Kraft Foods in spite of their board’s objection does not mean that the
Cadbury board was irrelevant —the Kraft Foods offer might have been lower had the Cadbury
board not fulfilled its advisory role. On the other hand, by warning its shareholders that the
offer is inadequate the board creates adverse selection that is intensified by their free-riding be-
havior: Target shareholders accept the offer only if it is higher than the expected post-takeover
value of the target. Without significant private benefits of control, the bidder will try to avoid
overpaying for the target by low-balling the offer, and as a consequence, increasing the risk of
receiving a negative recommendation. At the extreme, the takeover premium in equilibrium
is too low and target shareholders reject the offer irrespective of what the board recommends
them to do. If the takeover is expected to increase value, following the advice of the board can
result with a lower expected target shareholder value in equilibrium.
The influence of the target board in equilibrium depends on several factors. First, it
increases with the quality of the board’s private information and the underlying uncertainty
about the target. In both cases, the board has more information to share with its shareholders,
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who are therefore willing to listen. Second, since a recommendation to reject the offer is a
signal that the target is undervalued, in equilibrium, the revised offer is always higher than
the initial offer. Therefore, the anticipation that the bidder will sweeten his initial offer gives
the target board more reasons to recommend shareholders against it. If the board is biased
against the takeover, the possibility of a bid revision exacerbates this bias and harms the
credibility of the board. However, if the board is biased in favour of the takeover, the possibility
of a bid revision counters this tendency and increases the influence of the board. Third,
and perhaps surprisingly, the influence of the board can increase with its bias against the
takeover. In particular, the model predicts a U-shape relationship between the independence
of the board and the likelihood that target shareholders ignore its recommendation to reject a
takeover offer. Intuitively, the objective of an unbiased board, which is to maximize the value
of shareholders as a collective, is different from the objective of each individual shareholder.
Indeed, due to free-riding, each shareholder has incentives to keep his share, hoping that other
shareholders would tender their shares and approve the takeover. As a result, shareholders
inevitably reject offers that benefit them collectively. A value-maximizing board distorts its
recommendation in an attempt to resolve this coordination failure: It misrepresents the value of
the target to convince shareholders that the offer is more attractive than it seems. Shareholders
anticipate this paternalism and do not take the recommendations of the board on their face
value. In equilibrium, these recommendations are contaminated with noise, and consequently,
shareholders limit the extent to which they follow the advice of their unbiased board.6 By
contrast, if the board is biased against the takeover, for example, because directors can lose
their job and the associated perks, it has weaker incentives to correct this coordination failure.
In fact, the board would exploit the tendency of shareholders to free-ride and recommend them
to reject some value-increasing offers. If the resulting distortion from the self-serving motives
6Although the target board tries to overcome the free-riding problem, its impact is limited in equilibrium.
Studies by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Hirshleifer and Titman (1990), Cornelli and Li (2002), Kyle and Vila
(1991), Mueller and Panunzi (2004), Amihud et al. (2004), Marquez and Yilmaz (2012), At et al. (2011) and
Burkart et al. (1998), propose different ways to mitigate the free-riding problem.
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of the board is not too large, it coincides with shareholders’free-riding behavior and reduces
the tension between the board and each individual shareholder. As a result, a biased board
has more credibility than a value-maximizing board in equilibrium.
The model provides a framework to study the reaction of the market to the recommenda-
tions of the target board. When the board resists the takeover, the reaction of the market in
equilibrium can be either negative or positive. If the reaction is negative then target share-
holders follow the recommendation of the board to reject the takeover even though the market
penalizes them for doing so. Indeed, because of the free-riding problem, shareholders cannot
avoid rejecting some offers that benefit them collectively. If the reaction of the market is
positive then the recommendation of the board to reject the takeover reveals that the offer
undervalues the target. The market therefore cheers the decision of target shareholders to
reject the offer. I show that the resistance of the target board is more likely to generate a
negative (rather than positive) market reaction in equilibrium when the target board is biased
against the takeover, the takeover is likely to generate high synergy or private benefits for the
bidder, the offer is likely to be the bidder’s “best and final offer”, or the target board is not
well informed relative to its shareholders.
The bias of the board (i.e., directors’ non-independence) and the quality of its private
information (i.e., directors’expertise) play a key role in the analysis. The background, qual-
ifications, and affi liation of directors, as well as the compensation they receive, affect these
characteristics. What is the structure of the board that maximizes the expected target share-
holder value in equilibrium? I show several results. First, fixing the independence of the board,
the optimal level of expertise is not necessarily the highest level of expertise. Second, fixing
the expertise of the board, it is always optimal to have a board with an intrinsic bias against
selling the firm. Third, when both dimensions are endogenized, the optimal board is biased
against the takeover but has the highest level of expertise possible. All together, the model
suggests that in the context of takeovers, it is optimal to populate the board with directors
who are either employed by the firm or have social and business ties with senior manage-
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ment. These directors have access to management and are likely to be informed, but they also
have incentives to protect the CEO, and hence, are biased against the takeover. Moreover, I
show that in equilibrium under the optimal board structure (in all three configurations) target
shareholders accept the takeover offer irrespective of the recommendation of the board, which
is uninformative. In other words, the inability to influence the decision of target shareholders
in equilibrium is a robust feature of an optimal board structure.7
Intuitively, the optimal board structure is designed to convince the bidder to make an
offer so high that shareholders cannot refuse, no matter what the board recommends them
to do. The subtlety is that the credibility of the optimal board has to be high enough to
deter the bidder from low-balling the offer, but it cannot be too high so that the bidder can
guarantee the success of the takeover by bidding-up the price. Since shareholders cannot
commit not to follow a highly informative recommendation, too much expertise on the board
can be counterproductive —it exposes the bidder to adverse selection and forces him to shade
his offer. For a similar reason, the board has to be self-serving and suffi ciently biased against
selling the firm so that shareholders do not always follow its advice. Interestingly, the expertise
and the bias of the board complement each other: Higher expertise increases the credibility
of the board and therefore requires a larger bias to keep the credibility fixed. However, fixing
the credibility of the board, a larger bias against the takeover forces the bidder to bid even
higher to avoid a negative recommendation. Following this logic, when both the bias and the
expertise of the board are designed, it is optimal to bias the board against the takeover and
set its expertise at the highest level.
Overall, the analysis emphasizes that in the context of takeovers, a biased board has sig-
nificant advantages that have been previously overlooked. This observation is consistent with
Bange and Mazzeo (2004) who find that the takeover premium and the target shareholder
value are higher for targets with non-independent boards. Furthermore, the model predicts
7The result about the inability of the optimal board to influence the decision of its shareholders is derived
in the context of takeovers. In practice, the optimal structure of the board and its behavior may also depend
on factors that are not related to takeovers (e.g., the investment policy of the firm), and therefore, are not
captured by the analysis in this paper.
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that if corporate boards are structured optimally (with respect to takeovers), takeover offers
would embed a relatively high premium, these offers are likely to be supported by the target
board (since the premium is abnormally high), but when the board is recommending against
the takeover, the target shareholders are likely to ignore these recommendations which are
uninformative.
This paper contributes to the literature on managerial resistance in takeovers (Bagnoli
et al. (1989), Baron (1983), Berkovitch and Khanna (1990), Hirshleifer and Titman (1990),
Harris and Raviv (1988), and Ofer and Thakor (1987)). Different from this literature, here
the target board cannot unilaterally block the takeover; it must convince target shareholders
that it is in their best interest to reject the offer. Since the ability of the board to resist a
takeover is endogenous, my framework can relate it to various characteristics of the acquirer
and the target. Models of takeovers with asymmetric information have been studied by Baron
(1983), Hirshleifer and Titman (1990), Marquez and Yilmaz (2008, 2012), Ofer and Thakor
(1987), Ohta and Yee (2008), and Shleifer and Vishny (1986). Unlike these studies, here the
board of directors of the target firm is privately informed about the value of the target, and
it communicates this information strategically to influence the decision of target shareholders.
To best of my knowledge, the role of corporate boards in advising their shareholders about
takeovers has not be addressed by the existing literature. Finally, the paper is related to
Adams and Ferreira (2007), Harris and Raviv (2008), Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2012), and
Levit (2012), who study the trade-offbetween board independence and effective communication
with the manager. Similar to these studies, I show that a biased advisory board can be better
than an unbiased advisory board from the perspective of uninformed shareholders. However,
instead of advising the manager, in this paper the board advises shareholders whether to accept
a takeover offer, which is one of the key duties of corporate boards. Because the takeover offer
is endogenous and affected by the ability of the target board to influence its shareholders,
the optimal board structure has a unique and surprising feature —it cannot effectively use its
private information to influence the decision of shareholders in equilibrium.
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2. Setup
A public firm, the target, is owned by a continuum of homogeneous shareholders and run by
its board of directors. Each shareholder holds one non-divisible share and each share carries
one vote. The number of shares is normalized to one. According to the governance rules of the
firm, a successful takeover requires at least half of its voting rights. A bidder is considering the
acquisition of the firm. The value of the target firm under the control of the incumbent board
is q̃ which is uniformly distributed on [q, q], where 0 ≤ q < q. The difference between q and q
measures the level of uncertainty about the standalone value of the target, which is affected by
the availability of external sources of public information (e.g., target stock price, debt ratings,
or analyst coverage) or the volatility, intangibility, and complexity of the underlying assets of
the target. The standalone value of the target also captures the possibility that the target
remains independent for a while and then is acquired by a different bidder. The value of the
target firm under the control of the bidder is q̃+∆, where ∆ is common knowledge. Consistent
with the empirical evidence that takeovers on average create value (e.g., Andrade et al. (2001)
and Bhagat et al. (2005)), I assume ∆ ≥ 0. All players are risk neutral.
The game consists of five stages. At the outset, the bidder makes an (initial) offer to target
shareholders. Following Grossman and Hart (1980), tender offers are the only admissible mode
of takeovers. When making an offer, the bidder commits to buy all tendered shares conditional
on gaining control of the target, that is, at least half of the shareholders tendered their shares.
The focus is on conditional offers, which are common in practice. An offer consists of a cash
payment that each shareholder receives in return for selling the bidder his share of the target
firm. I denote the initial offer by p1 ≥ 0. If a shareholder decides to keep his share, he
retains exactly one share of the target under either management. In particular, the value to
non-controlling shareholders under the bidder’s control is given by q̃ + ∆.8
8The assumption that non-tendering shareholders can hold onto their shares is not necessary. Alternatively,
the bidder can take the firm private and try to “freeze-out”non-tendering shareholders. As long as nontendering
shareholders hold some bargaining power and expect to capture a fraction of the surplus, even if it is arbitrarily
small, collective action problems are present and the results of the paper continue to hold (see also Mueller and
Panunzi (2004) for a discussion on the fragility of freezeout mergers as a panacea to the free-riding problem).
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In the second stage, the board advises its shareholders about the takeover. The target
board is in a better position than its shareholders to estimate by how much the takeover offer
increases (or decreases) the value of their shares. Indeed, directors have superior information as
an integral part of their job, especially in the context of takeovers as the law requires directors
to inform themselves of all relevant information when evaluating a takeover proposal.9 To focus
attention on the advisory role of the board, I assume that the board privately observes signal
s̃ on q̃ while target shareholders are uninformed. Bidders also have limited information about
the standalone value of the target and rely heavily upon its financial statements. For those
reasons and for simplicity, I also assume that the bidder is uninformed about q̃. The signal of
the board has the following properties:
s̃ =
q̃ with probability λ ∈ (0, 1]ε̃ with probability 1− λ, (1)
where ε̃ and q̃ are identically and independently distributed. Parameter λ measures the preci-
sion of the target board’s private information. It can be interpreted as the level of expertise on
the board, which is a mix of the industry knowledge, experience, formal education, and talent
of its members.
To study the advisory role of the board, I assume that the only mean by which the board
can affect the outcome of the takeover is by communicating private information to target
shareholders. Intuitively, although in some jurisdictions corporate boards can use defensive
measures such as “poison pills”to resist a takeover, withstanding a pressure from shareholders
for a long period time is typically not feasible —the board must persuade shareholders that
it acts in their best interests.10 The board, whose members are assumed to speak in one
Bates et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence that is consistent with minority shareholders holding some
bargaining power in freezeout mergers.
9See the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Smith vs. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
10In the UK, corporate boards cannot use poison pills unless shareholders explicitly approve them. In Canada,
poison pills can “buy time”for the target board, but they cannot be used to block the takeover for an unlimited
period of time. In the US, poison pills have no “expiration date”. Empirically, Heron and Lie (2006) and Bates
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voice, recommends that shareholders either accept or reject the offer. The board can also be
more specific, for example, by providing its own estimate of the “fair”value of the target. In
the context of takeovers, the recommendations of the board are often based on the forecast
of future performances. By nature, this information is subjective and non-verifiable. While
the board can back its recommendations with the opinions of investments bankers, these “fair
opinions”often rubber-stamp the view of directors and do not contain additional information
(Kisgen et al. (2009)). Moreover, disclosure of proprietary information such as trade secrets
or development of new technologies is often too costly and rare in practice. Consistent with
this view, the private information of the board is assumed to be non-verifiable and the content
of the board’s recommendation does not affect its payoff directly. I denote by µ (s, p1) ∈ [q, q]
the message the board sends to target shareholders conditional on privately observing s̃ = s
and given the bidder’s initial offer p1. I assume that the message is public.
In the third stage, shareholders simultaneously decide whether to tender their shares to
the bidder in return for p1. Each target shareholder is negligible in size and believes that
his individual decision cannot change the outcome of the takeover. Moreover, shareholders
do not rely on the recommendations of the board naively. They are aware of the possibility
that the board can manipulate information to affect their decisions. Overall, the decision
of each shareholder to tender his share given initial offer p1 and message m is denoted by
φ1 (m, p1) ∈ {0, 1}, where φ1 = 1 stands for tendering and φ1 = 0 for not tendering.
In the fourth stage, the bidder can revise his initial offer if it failed. Specifically, if more
than 50% of target shareholders tendered their shares then the takeover succeeds, payoffs are
distributed, and the game ends. However, if more than 50% of target shareholders rejected the
initial offer then with an exogenous probability δ ∈ [0, 1) the bidder makes a new tender offer to
target shareholders, which can be higher than, identical to, or lower than the initial offer. With
probability 1−δ the bidder has to walk away from the deal and the target remains independent.
et al. (2008) find that anti-takeover measures do not significantly alter the likelihood that targets in contested
bid are ultimately acquired. See the Online Appendix for a characterization of the conditions under which
target shareholders benefit from granting their board with the power to unilaterally reject the takeover.
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Parameter δ captures in a reduced form the possibility that the bidder’s initial offer is also his
“best and final offer”. Among other things, 1− δ reflects the inability of the bidder to secure
additional funds that might be needed to raise the initial offer, the benefit from establishing a
reputation for being a tough negotiator in the market for corporate control (which is relevant
for serial acquirers), the likelihood that an alternative and superior investment opportunity
emerges, or the inability to generate synergy if the acquisition of the target is delayed. I
denote the revised offer by p2 (m, p1).
Finally, if the initial tender offer is rejected by shareholders and then revised by the bidder,
similar to the third stage, target shareholders make their final tendering decision and the game
ends. I denote by φ2 (m, p1, p2) ∈ {0, 1} the decision of each shareholder to tender his share
in return for the revised offer p2. Note that in the baseline model the board does not send
shareholders an additional message if the initial offer is revised. In Section 3.5 I consider a
variant of the model in which the board can also revise its initial recommendation.
2.1. Payoffs
If the takeover fails, the value of each share is the realized value of q̃. If an offer p is accepted,
each tendering shareholder gets p for his share, and each non-tendering shareholder obtains a
value of q̃ + ∆. I denote the aggregate target shareholder value by ṽ. In equilibrium, ṽ is a
function of the realized standalone value of the target, the synergy, the tender offer, and the
number of shareholders who tendered their shares.
The possibility of a takeover can introduce conflicts of interest between the target board
and its shareholders. The utility of the target board is given by
w̃ = ṽ +
β if the takeover fails0 if the takeover succeeds. (2)
If β = 0 then the board is unbiased and its recommendations are given to maximize target
shareholder value. However, if β > 0 then the board is biased against selling the target and
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it may advise shareholders to reject offers that increase value. A bias against the takeover
can arise if the takeover threatens directors’compensation, power, prestige, or firm-specific
human capital (Harford (2003)). Under this interpretation, higher β represents a board with
more insiders, fewer independent directors, and a more powerful CEO. Alternatively, β > 0
if directors represent other stakeholders whose wealth is negatively related to the success of a
takeover, for example, the labor force. By contrast, if β < 0 then the board is biased in favor of
selling the target and it may advise shareholders to accept offers that undervalue the firm. For
example, an assurance by the bidding firm of continuity in directors’positions, or a promised
bonus upon successful transaction, can bias the board in favor of the takeover (Hartzell et al.
(2004)).
Finally, the bidder has a benefit b ≥ 0 from the takeover that does not accrue to target
shareholders. Managers benefit from acquisitions by gaining prestige from managing larger
firms, reducing exposure of idiosyncratic risk, consuming perks, obtaining higher compensation,
and reducing of the likelihood of a hostile takeover (Grinstein and Hribar (2004) and Harford
and Li (2007)). Therefore, bidding firms with a weaker corporate governance (e.g., firms
with dispersed shareholder base, low stock ownership by management, entrenched board, lack
of institutional ownership, etc.) will have larger private benefits from acquiring the target.
Alternatively, private benefits from control can stem from self-dealing with the target. Either
way, if the takeover succeeds then the bidder consumes his private benefits b and earns q̃+∆−p
on each of the tendered shares.11
2.2. Solution concept
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game consists of five parts: the bidder’s initial offer
p∗1, the communication strategy of the target board µ
∗, shareholders’initial tendering decision
φ∗1, the bidder revised offer p
∗
2, and shareholders’final tendering decision φ
∗
2. Specifically, the
equilibrium is defined as follows: (i) For any message m and tendering stage i ∈ {1, 2}, the
11The bidder’s private benefits from control are exogenous and commonly known. See Burkart et al. (1998)
for a model with endogenous private benefits.
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strategy φ∗i maximizes the expected utility of each shareholder given that other shareholders
are expected to follow φ∗i , taking as given µ
∗ and p∗i . As standard in the literature on takeovers,
φ∗i is a symmetric pure-strategy and it cannot be weakly dominated.
12 Moreover, (ii) for any
p∗1 and realization of s̃, if message m is in the support of µ
∗, then m maximizes the expected
utility of the board given φ∗1, p
∗
2, and φ
∗
2; (iii) the initial tender offer p
∗
1 maximizes the bidder’s
expected profit given µ∗, φ∗1, p
∗
2, and φ
∗
2; (iv) for any message m, the revised offer p
∗
2 maximizes
the bidder’s expected profit given µ∗ and φ∗2. Finally, all agents have rational expectations in
that each player’s belief about the other players’strategies is correct in equilibrium. Moreover,
all agents use Bayes’rules to update their beliefs from the board’s message about q̃.
3. Analysis
Consider first the collective decision of target shareholders to tender their shares. Let p be
tender offer made by the bidder and let q̂ (m) be the beliefs of target shareholders about the
expected value of q̃ conditional on message m. Since the tender offer is conditional and no
shareholder is pivotal for the outcome, there always exists an equilibrium in which the tender
offer fails. This observation is a standard result in the literature on takeovers. It holds both
in the initial tendering stage as well as in the final tendering stage, and it is independent of
the message of the board. However, if the tender offer is expected to succeed, each shareholder
compares the tender offer p to the value of his share under the new management, which is
given by q̂ (m) + ∆. If p ≥ q̂ (m) + ∆ then tendering is a best response for each shareholder,
and if p < q̂ (m) + ∆ then each shareholder is better off holding onto his share. As noted by
Grossman and Hart (1980), this free-riding behavior implies that value-increasing offers can be
collectively rejected by shareholders. Hereafter, I focus on equilibria of the tendering stage in
which shareholders never play weakly dominated strategies. The next result summarizes the
conditions under which a given tender offer is accepted by shareholders.
12There are few exceptions in the literature: Bagnoli and Lipman (1988) and Hirshleifer and Titman (1990).
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Lemma 1 In any equilibrium of the tendering stage in which weakly dominated strategies are
not played, target shareholders accept the tender offer p given message m if and only if
p ≥ q̂ (m) + ∆. (3)
According to Lemma 1, without more information, the lowest offer that shareholders accept
is q̂ (m) + ∆. Since the bidder shares the same beliefs with the shareholders about q̃, if the
initial offer is rejected by shareholders and an opportunity to revise it has emerged (which
happens with probability δ), the bidder revises his offer from p1 to q̂ (m) + ∆.
Lemma 2 Suppose the board sends message m with respect to initial offer p1. If the initial
offer is rejected by shareholders, then the revised offer is given by
p2 (m, p1) = q̂ (m) + ∆. (4)
Notice that since the bidder is uninformed about q̃, the beliefs of target shareholders are
not affected directly by his offer. However, the offer affects the message that is sent by the
board, and through this channel, it indirectly affects the shareholders’beliefs and the revised
offer in equilibrium.
3.1. Board’s recommendations
For any initial offer p1 there exists a proper subgame which I refer to as the “communication
subgame”. Consider the message of the board given p1. The message affects the outcome
of the takeover if it reveals information about q̃ and either changes the tendering decision of
target shareholders (at either stage) or encourages the bidder to revise the initial offer if it is
rejected. Equilibria of the communication subgame with this property are called “influential”.
Let M (p1) be the set of messages on the equilibrium path of the communication subgame.
The formal definition is given below.
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Definition 1 An equilibrium of the communication subgame is influential if there exist m′ 6=
m′′ ∈M (p1) such that E [q̃|m′] 6= E [q̃|m′′] and one of the following conditions hold:
(i) φ1 (m
′, p1) 6= φ1 (m′′, p1).
(ii) φ1 (m
′, p1) = φ1 (m
′′, p1) = 0, and p2 (m′, p1) 6= p2 (m′′, p1) or φ2 (m′, p1, p2 (m′, p1)) 6=
φ2 (m
′′, p1, p2 (m
′′, p1)) .
The next result shows that an influential equilibrium exists as long as the board can influ-
ence the collective decision of target shareholders with respect to the initial offer.13
Lemma 3 An equilibrium of the communication subgame is influential if and only if there are
m′ 6= m′′ ∈M (p1) such that
q̂ (m′) + ∆ ≤ p1 < q̂ (m′′) + ∆. (5)
Moreover, if δ > 0 and the equilibrium is not influential, then q̂ (m′) = q̂ (m′′) for all m′ 6=
m′′ ∈M (p1).
According to Lemma 3, if the equilibrium is influential then the message from the board
must be suffi ciently informative to change the beliefs of target shareholders about the value of
the firm and the resulting decision. However, the message cannot be informative if it does not
affect the collective decision of target shareholders, as prescribed by Lemma 1. Intuitively, one
might think that even if the message has no influence on the decision of target shareholders,
it may still change the incentives of the bidder to revise the initial bid if it is rejected by
shareholders. In this case, however, the board would send the message that maximizes the
revised offer irrespective of its private information about the fundamental value of the target.
Understanding the incentives of the board to inflate the revised offer, the bidder will ignore
this message, leaving the board with no influence on the outcome of the takeover.
13All omitted proofs are given in the Appendix.
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Lemma 3 also implies that if the equilibrium is influential then there are exactly two disjoint
sets of messages on the equilibrium path, MR (p1) and MA (p1), with distinctive properties. If
m ∈ MA (p1) then q̂ (m) + ∆ ≤ p1 and φ1 (m, p1) = 1. That is, shareholders tender their
shares and the takeover succeeds. Messages inMA (p1) can be interpreted as recommendations
to accept the initial offer p1. If m ∈ MR (p1) then p1 < q̂ (m) + ∆, shareholders reject the
initial offer, the bidder revises the offer to q̂ (m) + ∆ if an opportunity to do so emerges, and
when it does, shareholders accept the revised offer. Messages in MR (p1) can be interpreted
as recommendations to reject the initial offer p1. The unique property of influential equilibria
is that the board can influence the decision of target shareholders. Note that both MR (p1)
and MA (p1) can have more than one message in equilibrium. Hereafter, I use the terminology
“making a recommendation” to describe the board’s communication strategy and the term
“the board is influential”when the equilibrium of the communication subgame is influential.
If the equilibrium is influential then the expected payoff of the board conditional on s̃ is
W (m, p1, s̃) =
p1 if m ∈MA (p1)δ (q̂ (m) + ∆) + (1− δ) (E [q̃|s̃] + β) if m ∈MR (p1) . (6)
If δ > 0 (δ = 0) then conditional on recommending shareholders to reject the offer, the board
has strict (weak) incentives to send a message in arg maxm∈MR(p1) q̂ (m). Therefore, the board
recommends that shareholders accept the initial tender offer if and only if
p1 ≥ max
m∈MR(p1)
δ(q̂ (m) + ∆) + (1− δ) (E [q̃|s̃] + β) , (7)
which means that in any influential equilibrium there is a cutoff s∗ such that m ∈ MR (p1)⇔
s̃ > s∗. If s̃ = s∗ then the board is indifferent between recommending shareholders to reject or
accept the takeover. Therefore, m ∈MR (p1) implies q̂ (m) = E [q̃|s̃ > s∗], and s∗ must solve
p1 = τ (s
∗) (8)
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where
τ (x) ≡ δ (E [q̃|s̃ > x] + ∆) + (1− δ) (E [q̃|s̃ = x] + β) . (9)
Overall, the board recommends shareholders to accept offer p1 if and only if
τ (s̃) ≤ p1. (10)
Consistent with Bates and Becher (2016), the target board is more likely to oppose the deal
when the takeover premium is smaller.
The board is influential only if both types of recommendations are on the equilibrium path,
that is, s∗ ∈ (q, q) which is equivalent to τ(q) < p1 < τ(q). In equilibrium, shareholders
correctly anticipate the communication strategy of the board and use it to estimate the value
of the target before they make a decision. Because of free-riding, shareholders follow the
recommendation of the board to accept the initial offer if and only if
E [q̃|τ(s̃) ≤ p1] + ∆ ≤ p1. (11)
Similarly, shareholders follow the recommendation of the board to reject the initial offer if and
only if
p1 < E [q̃|τ(s̃) > p1] + ∆. (12)
According to Lemma 3, an influential equilibrium of the communication subgame exists only
if both of these conditions are satisfied.
Proposition 1 Let p1 be the bidder’s initial tender offer. An influential equilibrium of the
communication subgame exists if and only if τ(q) < p1 and p1 ∈ [τ(qL), τ(qH)) where
qL = q +
2
λ
max{0,∆− β − λ δ
1−δ
q−q
2
}
qH = q +
2
λ
min {0,∆− β} .
(13)
(i) If the equilibrium is influential, the board recommends shareholders to accept the initial
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tender offer if and only if τ(s̃) ≤ p1. If the recommendation is to accept then shareholders
tender their shares and the bidder acquires the target. If the recommendation is to reject
then the initial offer fails. With probability δ the bidder revises the initial offer to p2 =
E [q̃|τ(s̃) > p1]+∆ and shareholders tender their shares. With probability 1−δ the bidder
withdraws his bid and the target remains independent.
(ii) If the equilibrium is not influential, shareholders ignore the board’s recommendation,
which is uninformative, and accept the initial offer if and only if E [q̃] + ∆ ≤ p1. If the
initial offer is rejected, then with probability δ the bidder revises it to p2 = E [q̃] + ∆ and
shareholders tender their shares. With probability 1− δ the bidder withdraws his bid and
the target remains independent.
According to Proposition 1, if p1 ∈ [τ(qL), τ(qH)) (and τ(q) < p1) then there is an equi-
librium of the communication subgame in which shareholders follow the recommendations of
the board. In this equilibrium, the outcome of the takeover is uncertain and it depends on the
type of the recommendation that the board issues. By contrast, if p1 6∈ [τ(qL), τ(qH)) then no
equilibrium of the communication subgame is influential, the outcome of the takeover does not
depend on the recommendation of the board, and at least one type of recommendation (accept
or reject) is ignored by shareholders. Specifically, suppose that qL < qH , where qL and qH are
given by (13). It can be verified that qL < qH implies τ(qL) < E [q̃] + ∆ < τ(qH). Therefore,
if p1 < τ(qL) then shareholders ignore the board’s recommendation to accept the offer, they
reject it, and the takeover fails unless the bidder revises his initial offer. If p1 ≥ τ(qH) then
shareholders ignore the board’s recommendation to reject the offer, they accept it, and the
takeover succeeds.
The interval [τ(qL), τ(qH)) can measure the potential of the board to influence the decision
of target shareholders. In particular, if qL ≥ qH then this interval is empty and there is no
offer with respect to which the board is influential.
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Corollary 1 Let qL and qH be as defined in (13). Then, qL < qH if and only if
β ∈ (∆− λ 1
1− δ
q − q
2
,∆ + λ
q − q
2
). (14)
Moreover:
(i) τ(qH)− τ(qL) increases in λ and q − q.
(ii) τ(qH)− τ(qL) increases in δ if and only if β < ∆− λ δ1−δ
q−q
2
.
(iii) τ(qH)− τ(qL) increases in β −∆ if and only if β −∆ < 0.
Part (i) of Corollary 1 shows that the influence of the board increases with the expertise of
the board and the uncertainty about the value of the target. These two measure the information
advantage the board has relative to its shareholders. The larger this information advantage
is, the more influence the board can exert. Part (ii) shows that the influence of the board can
increase with δ. In equilibrium, a recommendation to reject the offer is a signal that the value
of the target is higher than expected, and therefore, the bidder has a tendency to increase the
bid if it is initially rejected. As a result, the anticipation that the bidder will sweeten the initial
offer gives the target board more reasons to recommend shareholders to reject it. Therefore,
higher δ can harm the credibility of the board. However, this intuition is correct only when
β is relatively large, that is, when the board has over-tendency to recommend shareholders to
reject the offer. When β is relatively small, the opposite is true. In these cases, the board
is inclined toward recommending the shareholders to accept the offer. Higher δ counters this
tendency and thereby increases the credibility of the board.
Part (iii) of Corollary 1 and condition (14) show that the board can influence its shareholders
in equilibrium only if its bias is “moderate”. If β is too large or too small, shareholders ignore
the board since they are concerned that its recommendations are primarily motivated by the
desire to protect its private benefits/costs from obtaining control. Importantly, Corollary 1
demonstrates that a biased board can have more influence in equilibrium than an unbiased
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board. Indeed, the size of the interval [τ(qL), τ(qH)), which measures the credibility of the
board, is increasing with β when β < ∆. Since ∆ > 0, a board with a bias β ∈ (0,∆) has
more influence than an unbiased board (β = 0). Moreover, if 0 ≤ ∆− λ 1
1−δ
q−q
2
then condition
(14) requires β > 0. In this case, there is no offer with respect to which the unbiased board
is influential. By contrast, if the board is biased against the takeover and its bias satisfies
condition (14), then there is a nontrivial set of offers with respect to which the biased board
is influential.
Why would shareholders ignore the unbiased board if its objective is to maximize their
value? The intuition is the following. If β = 0 then the objective of the board is to maximize
the value of shareholders as a collective. However, due to free-riding, this objective is different
from the objective of each individual shareholder. Because of these differences, the board
has incentives to misstate its private information, and consequently, its private information is
never fully revealed in equilibrium. To see why, let δ = 0 and suppose on the contrary that
in equilibrium the unbiased board fully reveals its information. That is, for every q̂ ∈ [q, q]
there is a unique message m∗ (q̂) such that, in equilibrium, the board sends message m∗ (q̂)
when q̃ = q̂. Suppose q̃ = q̂ where q̂ ∈ (p1 − ∆, p1]. If the board sends message m∗(q̂) then
shareholders believe that the standalone value of the target is q̂. Since p1 < q̂ + ∆, according
to (3), each shareholder has incentives to keep his share, hoping that other shareholders would
tender their shares and approve the takeover. As a result, the takeover is rejected even though
shareholders are offered a premium relative to standalone value of the target, i.e., q̂ ≤ p1.
This is the free-rider problem. To convince shareholders to accept the offer, which clearly
benefits them as a collective, the unbiased board pretends that the offer is more attractive
than it really is by falsely stating that q̃ + ∆ ≤ p1. Specifically, instead of sending message
m∗ (q̂) as the equilibrium prescribes, the board has incentives to deviate and send the message
m∗(q0) 6= m∗ (q̂) where q0 < q̂ satisfies q0 + ∆ ≤ p1. Therefore, the information of the unbiased
board is never fully revealed in equilibrium.
In equilibrium, the manipulation of the unbiased board is anticipated by shareholders, who
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do not take its recommendations on their face value. As a result, these recommendations are
contaminated with noise and shareholders are less likely to follow them. A relatively small
τ(qH)− τ(qL) reflects the low credibility of the unbiased board. Under certain conditions, the
credibility of the unbiased board is too low (e.g., when 0 ≤ ∆−λ 1
1−δ
q−q
2
) and shareholders refuse
to follow these recommendations altogether, that is, the interval [τ(qL), τ(qH)) is empty. This
argument illustrates that shareholders’failure to coordinate their collective decision creates a
tension with the unbiased board, which harms its ability to effectively advise them about the
takeover.14
Interestingly, a biased board can have more influence than a value-maximizing (and unbi-
ased) board. If δ = 0 then the biased board would like shareholders to accept the takeover
offer if and only if q̂ + β ≤ p1. Therefore, similar to the arguments above, a biased board has
incentives to misrepresent its private information when q̂ ∈ (p1 − ∆, p1 − β]. If β ∈ (0,∆)
then this interval is smaller than (p1 −∆, p1], and in this respect, the incentives of the biased
board to manipulate are weaker. If β = ∆ then the interval above is empty and the biased
board can fully reveal its information in equilibrium. Intuitively, the bias of the board can
relax the tension that is created by the collective action problem. When β > 0 the board has
self-serving reasons to keep the target independent, and in some cases, it recommends that
shareholders reject the takeover offer even if it provides a premium relative to standalone value
of the target. At the same time, shareholders free-ride each other, and thus, similar to the
biased board but for a different reason, they collectively reject value-increasing offers. As long
as the bias of the board against the takeover is not too large, the preferences of the board are
effectively “closer”to the objective of each shareholder individually, and consequently, a biased
board can exert more influence than a value-maximizing board. Overall, the credibility of the
board, as measured by τ(qH) − τ(qL), obtains its maximum when β = ∆. In this case, the
distortion from the free-riding behavior of target shareholders coincides with the self-serving
14This argument also holds with a finite number of shareholders. More generally, it is related to the idea
that externalities between group members can create incentives to manipulate information (e.g., Farrell and
Gibbons (1989), Dessí (2008), Hanson (2003) and Teoh (1997)).
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motives of their board.
Remark There always exists a non-influential equilibrium of the communication subgame in
which the board randomizes between different messages, and the randomization is independent
of s̃. The existence of a “babbling” equilibrium is standard in the cheap talk literature. If
the conditions in Proposition 1 hold then the communication subgame has multiple equilibria:
one equilibrium in which the board is influential and another equilibrium in which the board
is not influential. Following the cheap talk literature, I assume that whenever an influential
equilibrium of the communication subgame exists, this equilibrium is in play.15
3.2. Initial offer
The initial offer of the bidder depends on the type of recommendation that the board is expected
to issue and the response of target shareholders. If condition (14) is violated then regardless of
the offer, every equilibrium of the communication subgame is non-influential, and the game is
played as if no communication between the board and the target shareholders is taking place.
Since target shareholders believe that the expected value of the firm under the bidder’s control
is E [q̃] + ∆, they accept the initial tender offer if and only if p1 ≥ E [q̃] + ∆ (as suggested by
Lemma 1). Moreover, since no information about q̃ is revealed, the option to revise the initial
offer has no effect and the outcome is similar to Grossman and Hart (1980): The bidder offers
p∗1 = E [q̃] + ∆, target shareholders accept the initial offer irrespective of the recommendation
of the board, and the takeover succeeds. However, if condition (14) holds then the ability of
the board to influence the outcome of the takeover depends on the offer itself as described by
Proposition 1. The next result characterizes the equilibrium in those cases.
Proposition 2 Suppose condition (14) holds. There exist cutoffs 0 ≤ b ≤ b <∞ such that in
equilibrium the following hold:
(i) If b ∈ [0, b) then the bidder offers p∗1 < τ (qL), the board is not influential, and target
15A previous version of the paper showed that similar results hold under different selections of equilibria.
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shareholders reject the initial offer irrespective of the board’s recommendation.
(ii) If b ∈ (b, b) then the bidder offers p∗1 = τ(max {qL, s∗∗}) where
s∗∗ = q +
1
λ
(∆ + b− β)− δ
1− δ
q − q
2
, (15)
the board is influential and target shareholders follow its recommendations.16
(iii) If b ∈
[
b,∞
)
then the bidder offers p∗1 = τ (qH), the board is not influential, and target
shareholders accept the initial offer irrespective of the board’s recommendation.
In all cases, the equilibrium of the communication subgame unfolds as described by Proposition
1. In particular, if the initial offer is rejected and revised by the bidder on the equilibrium path,
then p∗1 < p
∗
2.
According to Proposition 2, there are three cases to consider. First, when b ∈ [0, b) share-
holders reject the initial offer even if the board recommends them to accept it. When the
board is influential, the bidder suffers from adverse selection: The board is recommending the
shareholders to accept the offer if and only if it is high enough to compensate the board for the
standalone value of the firm and the loss of its private benefits from control. Higher β makes
this problem more severe since a positive recommendation becomes a stronger indication that q̃
is lower than expected. The shareholders’free-riding behavior also magnifies this concern since
the bidder can successfully acquire the target only if he pays shareholders at least the value of
the firm under his control. When b is small, the bidder does not have enough private benefits
from control to compensate for the expected over-payment, if his offer is accepted. The only
way the bidder can avoid losing money is by low-balling the initial offer, such that it reflects
the negative information about q̃ that positive recommendations convey. In this equilibrium
the bidder offers p∗1 < τ (qL) < E [q̃] + ∆; however, a low-balled initial offer is always rejected
by shareholders.
16If b = b then part (i) holds when β ≥ ∆− λ δ1−δ
q−q
2 and part (ii) holds otherwise.
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Second, when b ∈
[
b,∞
)
the bidder has high intrinsic motivation to acquire the target, and
therefore, he tries to minimize the risk of a failure. Specifically, if b is large then the bidder
makes the offer attractive to target shareholders such that they find it optimal to accept it
even if the board recommends them otherwise. To the extent that public firms have a weaker
corporate governance and higher private benefits (due to their dispersed ownership structure
and separation between ownership and control), this result is consistent with Bargeron et al.
(2008) and Betton et al. (2009) who find that relative to private firms, public firms offer
higher premiums. The former also find that the difference is highest when acquisitions by
private firms are compared to acquisitions by public firms with managerial ownership of less
than 1%, and insignificant with managerial ownership in excess of 50%. Interestingly, while
the board’s recommendation to reject the takeover offer is ignored by shareholders on the
equilibrium path, the bidder’s initial offer is strictly higher than what he would have offered in
the absence of communication, that is, p∗1 = τ (qH) > E [q̃]+∆. Indeed, the possibility that the
target board would alert its shareholders that the offer is inadequate is suffi cient to deter the
bidder from making a low offer. This result emphasizes that the board can have an influence
on the outcome of the takeover even if in equilibrium its recommendations are not followed by
shareholders. In other words, uninformative and ignored recommendations are not evidence
against the ability of the board to affect the outcome of the takeover.
Third, when b ∈ (b, b) the equilibrium is a combination of the two scenarios above. On
the one hand, the bidder has enough incentives to acquire the target even though he might
suffer from adverse selection. On the other hand, the bidder does not have enough incentives
to increase the offer and avoid a negative recommendation for sure. As a result, the bidder’s
initial offer is “moderate”and shareholders follow the recommendations of the board, which
are always informative. Since a recommendation to reject the offer increases the risk that
the takeover fails (δ < 1), it is a credible signal that the initial offer undervalues the target.
Consistent with empirical evidence (e.g., Bates and Becher (2016)), the revised offer is higher
than the initial offer, p∗1 < p
∗
2.
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The closed-form of b and b is given by expression (24) in the Appendix. Figure 1 depicts
these cutoffs as a function of β −∆. The difference b− b measures the influence of the board
in equilibrium, accounting for its effect on the bidder’s initial offer. Note that b − b obtains
its maximum when −λ δ
1−δ
q−q
2
≤ β −∆ ≤ 0. In this range, the balance between the incentives
of shareholders to free-ride and the incentives of the board to inflate the revised offer results
with the highest alignment of interests between the biased board and target shareholders. Also
note that b − b obtains its minimum when λ1−δ
2−δ
q−q
2
≤ β − ∆. In this range the board is not
influential in equilibrium for all b ≥ 0.
Figure 1
3.3. The determinants of the board’s influence
This section describes the effect of various parameters of the model on the ability of the target
board to influence the decision of its shareholders. For this purpose, I assume that there is an
ex-ante distribution from which the parameters of the model are drawn at the outset of the
game (the formal treatment is given in the Appendix). Under this formulation, the influence of
the board in equilibrium is probabilistic as it depends on the realization of these parameters.
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Proposition 3
(i) The probability that target shareholders accept the initial tender offer in equilibrium irre-
spective of the recommendation of the board increases in b, decreases in δ, λ and q − q,
and decreases in β if and only if β < ∆.
(ii) The probability that target shareholders reject the initial tender offer in equilibrium irre-
spective of the recommendation of the board decreases in b, increases in δ, λ and q − q,
and increases in β if and only if β < ∆ + λ1−δ
2−δ
q−q
2
.
According to the analysis in Section 3.2, target shareholders accept the initial tender offer
irrespective of the recommendation of the board if condition (14) is violated or b ∈
[
b,∞
)
. In
those cases, the board is not influential on the equilibrium path and its recommendations are
uninformative. These scenarios can be interpreted as instances in which shareholders ignore
a recommendation from their board to reject the initial tender offer. According to part (i) of
Proposition 3, the likelihood of these events is higher when the bidder has strong incentives
to minimize the risk of a failure, which is the case when the bidder has significant private
benefits (high b) but he is unlikely to sweeten the initial bid (low δ). The likelihood that
shareholders ignore a recommendation to reject the offer is also higher when the board has
very little influence, which is the case when its informational advantage is small (low λ or
q − q) or when there is a significant conflict of interest between the board and each individual
target shareholder (high |β −∆|). The latter observation demonstrates that the likelihood that
shareholders follow the recommendations of the board to reject the takeover is non-monotonic
in the board’s bias and follows an inverted U-shape.
Similarly, if condition (14) holds and b ∈ [0, b) then target shareholders reject the initial
tender offer irrespective of the recommendation of the board, which is uninformative. These
scenarios can be interpreted as instances in which shareholders ignore a recommendation from
their board to accept the initial tender offer. Part (ii) of Proposition 3 suggests that the
comparative statics is the opposite of part (i). Intuitively, shareholders ignore the board and
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reject the tender offer only if the initial offer is low-balled. The bidder low-balls the initial
offer when the target board can influence its shareholders but the bidder does not have enough
incentives to overcome the associated adverse selection. Notice that when the initial offer is
doomed to fail, the bidder may refrain from making the offer in the first place. Therefore,
instances in which shareholders ignore accept recommendations and reject the takeover are
less likely to be observed. This is consistent with the findings of Baker and Savasoglu (2002)
that the proportion of offers that were supported by the target board but failed is less than
a half of the proportion of offers that were resisted by the target board but the target was
eventually taken over by the acquirer.
Proposition 3 generates novel empirical predictions. The interpretation of b, δ, λ, q −
q and β, which are the independent variables of interest, is described in the setup of the
model.17 A natural proxy for the influence of the target board is the match between the
outcome of the takeover (success or failure) and the actual recommendation of the board
(accept or reject). Both variables can be directly observed by the econometrician.18 Since
the model predicts that the board influences the decision of target shareholders if and only
if its recommendation is informative, the influence of the board can also be measured by the
amount of private information that is revealed by the recommendation itself. The release of
information can be measured by the magnitude (in absolute level) of the abnormal returns of
the target’s stock around the time the board publicly issues its recommendation (conditional
on the announcement of the takeover bid), or by a text-based analysis of the details that the
board uses to back its recommendation (as was the case in the takeover of Cadbury by Kraft).
3.4. The market reaction to board’s recommendations
Let V ∗ be the expected shareholder value in equilibrium. With rational expectations, the
17Since β and λ can be endogenous, new regulations and court rulings that force changes in board structure,
or variations in laws across states and countries, can be used to identify the effect of β and λ.
18Schedule 14d-9 filings or press releases can be used to identify board’s recommendations. Since a takeover
can fail for reasons that are unrelated to the decision of the board or its shareholders (e.g., the bidder’s failure
to secure funds or clearance from regulators), one has to identify and exclude these cases (e.g., see Malmendier
et al. (2016)).
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market value of the target adjusts to V ∗ at the announcement of the takeover bid. According
to the analysis in Section 3.2, if condition (14) is violated then V ∗ = E [q̃] + ∆ and otherwise
V ∗ =

E [q̃] + δ∆ if b ∈ [0, b)
Pr [τ (s̃) ≤ p∗∗1 ] p∗∗1 + Pr [τ (s̃) > p∗∗1 ] (E [q̃|τ (s̃) > p∗1] + δ∆) if b ∈
[
b, b
)
τ (qH) if b ∈
[
b,∞
)
,
(16)
where p∗∗1 ≡ τ(max {qL, s∗∗}).
The focus of this section is on the reaction of the market to the recommendations of the
board conditional on the announcement of the takeover bid. Let the market reaction in equi-
librium be r∗. If condition (14) is violated or b 6∈
[
b, b
)
then the board is not influential
in equilibrium and its recommendations are uninformative. The market correctly anticipates
that shareholders would ignore the board and accept the offer if and only if it is higher than
E [q̃] + ∆. Since there is no news or surprise, r∗ = 0. If condition (14) holds and b ∈
[
b, b
)
then p∗1 = p
∗∗
1 and the board is influential in equilibrium. Let r
∗
Accept (r
∗
Reject) be the value of r
∗
following a recommendation of the board to accept (reject) the offer. Then
r∗Accept = p
∗∗
1 − V ∗ = Pr [τ (s̃) > p∗∗1 ]×H∗∗. (17)
r∗Reject = E [q̃|τ (s̃) > p∗∗1 ] + δ∆− V ∗ = −Pr [τ (s̃) ≤ p∗∗1 ]×H∗∗ (18)
where
H∗∗ ≡ p∗∗1 − E [q̃|τ (s̃) > p∗∗1 ]− δ∆. (19)
Since r∗Reject and r
∗
Accept have opposite signs, the discussion below only refers to r
∗
Reject.
There are two scenarios. First, if r∗Reject < 0 then p
∗∗
1 is relatively high and the market
penalizes the target when the board resists the takeover. Shareholders follow the recommenda-
tion of the board to reject the takeover in spite of the negative reaction of the market. Indeed,
because of their free-riding behavior, shareholders cannot avoid rejecting some offers that ben-
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efit them collectively. Second, if r∗Reject > 0 then p
∗∗
1 is relatively low and the market cheers
when the board resists the takeover. Here, the resistance of the board is a credible signal that
the offer undervalues the target (τ (s̃) > p∗∗1 ) and that a sweeten bid is likely (δ > 0).
Proposition 4 Suppose condition (14) holds and b ∈
[
b, b
)
. In equilibrium, r∗Reject < 0 is
more likely than r∗Reject > 0 when β, ∆, and b are large, or δ, λ, and q − q are small.19
Intuitively, the resistance of the board to the takeover is bad news for the target when the
offer is rejected to protect the board’s private benefits from control rather than because the
target is undervalued (large β); when the takeover was likely to generate high synergy or high
value for the bidder (large ∆ and b); when the offer was likely to be the bidder’s “best and
final offer”(small δ); when the target board is not well informed relative to the market (small
λ and q − q).
Empirically, the market reacts negatively to announcements of a takeover termination (e.g.,
Malmendier et al. (2016) and the references therein). This evidence suggests that on average
r∗Reject < 0. Typically, however, the reaction of the market to the actual recommendation of
the target board is not directly estimated. One exception is Safieddine and Titman (1999),
who claim that target stock prices declined 3.42% on average as a reaction to an explicit
announcement by the target management that it rejects the offer because “the price is too low
or inadequate.”Among other things, Proposition 4 suggests that these negative reactions are
attributed to a bias of these boards against the takeover. Interestingly, Safieddine and Titman
(1999) also identify a subset of targets which remained independent and outperformed their
benchmarks. Under rational expectations, these targets should have experienced a positive
market reaction to a termination announcement, that is, r∗Reject > 0. Nevertheless, the authors
do not find such evidence and conclude that the market must have underestimated the extent
to which the values of these firms were improved. Proposition 4 generates novel empirical
predictions about the expected reaction of the market to the recommendations of the board in
19As in Section 3.3, the probabilistic nature of the result reflects an ex-ante distribution from which the
parameters of the model are drawn at the outset of the game.
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the cross section, and can be used to interpret existing findings. The market reaction can be
measured by the sign of the abnormal returns of the target’s stock around the announcement
of the board’s recommendation.
Finally, let Vpre be the “unaffected”market value of the target prior to the arrival of the
bidder. If the market does not expect a takeover to take place, then Vpre = E [q̃]. Notice that
V ∗ ≥ E [q̃], and in this respect, the unexpected announcement of a takeover is always good
news, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. Also notice that E [q̃|τ (s̃) > p∗∗1 ] > E [q̃].
Therefore, regardless of the sign of r∗Reject, the market value of the target after the failure of
the takeover remains higher than it was prior to the announcement of the takeover. This
observation is also consistent with the empirical evidence (e.g., Malmendier et al. (2016)).
3.5. Revised recommendations
In the baseline model the board does not issue a new recommendation if the initial offer is
revised. Generally, the target board is less likely to influence the decision of its shareholders
with respect to the revised offer. There are two reasons behind this result. First, according to
Proposition 2, if the initial offer is rejected by shareholders then the board must have revealed
that s̃ ≥ s∗ for some s∗ ∈ [q, q]. Therefore, if a second round of negotiations takes place, target
shareholders (and the bidder) face less uncertainty about q̃. According to part (i) of Corollary
1, lower uncertainty weakens the ability of the board to influence its shareholders. As a result,
if shareholders follow the recommendation of board and reject the initial offer, they are less
likely to follow its recommendations with respect the revised offer. Second, the revised offer
is always the “best and final offer”(or generally, more likely to be the final offer). Therefore,
unlike the initial offer, recommending shareholders to reject the revised offer does not have the
benefit of convincing the bidder to increase it even further. This effect harms the credibility
of the board since there is no force that mitigates the tendency of the board to undervalue
the target in attempt to overcome the free-riding behavior of target shareholders. For both of
these reasons, the board is less likely to be influential with respect to the revised offer.
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Building on this reasoning, the next result shows that the main conclusions of the analysis
are robust to the possibility that the board would issue a new recommendation with respect
to the revised offer.
Proposition 5 Suppose the board can issue a second recommendation after the bidder revises
the initial offer but before target shareholders make their final decision. If
β 6∈ (∆− λ
q − q
2
,∆ + λ
q − q
2
) (20)
then the board is not influential with respect to the revised offer on or off the equilibrium path,
and the equilibrium unfolds as in Section 3.2.
In particular, Proposition 5 implies that if β ∈ (∆ − λ 1
1−δ
q−q
2
,∆ − λ q−q
2
], which is exactly
to the left of the interval described in (20), then the equilibrium unfolds exactly as described
by Proposition 2: The board affects the initial offer or its success, but the board is never
influential with respect to any revised offer.
In the Online Appendix I demonstrate that the analysis of the baseline model also extends
to cases in which β ∈ (∆ − λ q−q
2
,∆ + λ
q−q
2
). When β is relatively small, the rejection of the
initial offer by the board is a credible signal that the target is undervalued. Therefore, the
residual uncertainty about q̃ conditional on the first (negative) recommendation is relatively
small (i.e., s∗ is close to q), and the board cannot influence the decision of target shareholders
with respect to the revised offer. In this case, the second round unfolds as in the baseline
model. However, when β is relatively large, the rejection of the initial offer by the board is
mostly attributed to the board’s private benefits from control rather than the undervaluation of
the target. Therefore, the residual uncertainty following the first recommendation is relatively
large (i.e., s∗ is distant from q). Different from the baseline model, in this case the board is
influential with respect to the revised offer, and on the equilibrium path it is possible that the
board changes his recommendation from reject to accept, or keeps it unchanged.
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4. Optimal board structure
In this section I study the optimal structure of the board from the perspective of target share-
holders in the context of takeovers. For this purpose, let V ∗ (β, λ) be the expected shareholder
value in equilibrium as a function of the bias of the board β and its expertise λ. The explicit
form of V ∗ (β, λ) is given in Section 3.4. Similarly, let b (β, λ) and b (β, λ) be the cutoffs from
Proposition 2.
4.1. Optimal board expertise
Let λ∗ be the optimal level of expertise for a given level of β. If β 6∈ (∆− 1
1−δ
q−q
2
,∆+
q−q
2
) then
condition (14) is violated for any λ ∈ [0, 1], and according to Corollary 1, the expertise of the
board has no effect on the takeover. Since the expertise of the board might still be desired by
shareholders for reasons that are outside of the model, I assume that if arg maxλ∈[0,1] V (β, λ)
takes more than one value then λ∗ is the maximum of this set. Under this assumption, if
β 6∈ (∆− 1
1−δ
q−q
2
,∆ +
q−q
2
) then λ∗ = 1. The next result analyzes the complement case.
Proposition 6 Suppose β ∈ (∆ − 1
1−δ
q−q
2
,∆ +
q−q
2
). In equilibrium under the optimal board
expertise (λ = λ∗) the board is not influential and target shareholders accept the initial offer
irrespective of its recommendation. Moreover,
(i) If β ∈ (∆− 1
1−δ
q−q
2
,∆− b
1−δ ) then λ
∗ ∈ (0, 1) and condition (14) is violated.
(ii) If β ∈ (∆− 1
1−δ max{
q−q
2
, b},∆ + q−q
2
) then condition (14) holds. Moreover:
(a) If b ≥ b (β, 1) then λ∗ = 1, and if b < b (β, 1) then λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that b (β, λ∗) = b.
(b) λ∗ is increasing in β if and only if β ≥ ∆.
The closed-form of λ∗ is given by expression (58) in the Appendix. Proposition 6 demon-
strates that more expertise on the board does not necessarily benefit target shareholders, that
is, V (β, λ) can decrease in λ. This result holds even if the board’s objective is to maximize
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shareholder value (β = 0). Moreover, under the optimal board structure, the recommendations
of the board are uninformative and ignored by shareholders in equilibrium. This results holds
even if λ∗ = 1, i.e., when the optimal board is perfectly informed.
There are two reasons behind this result. First, as the discussion around part (i) of Propo-
sition 2 suggests, target shareholders expose the bidder to adverse selection whenever they
follow the informative recommendations of their board. If b is suffi ciently small the adverse
selection can result with a low-balled offer and a failure of the takeover. Since the takeover
is expected to create value, shareholders end up being worse off. Limiting the expertise of
the board is a mean by which shareholders commit to ignoring their board, which mitigates
the adverse selection and encourages the bidder to increase the offer. Part (i) of Proposition
6 suggests that even though a fully informed board could affect the outcome of the takeover
(condition (14) holds when λ = 1), shareholders are better off with a board that has no effect
whatsoever (setting λ∗ < 1 such that condition (14) is violated).
Second, if b is relatively large, the bidder is willing to pay a higher price to avoid a negative
recommendation from the board and guarantee the success of the takeover. Since the takeover
is value increasing, shareholders can extract more surplus if the takeover is likely to succeed.
By limiting the expertise of the board, shareholders effectively commit to accepting offers that
they would have otherwise rejected, thereby incentivizing the bidder to increase the takeover
premium. At the same time, shareholders must ensure that the board has enough private
information so it can credibility warn them when the bidder low-balls the premium. Part (ii.a)
of Proposition 6 shows that the optimal level of expertise accounts for this trade-off by setting
λ∗ such that b(β, λ∗) ≤ b. In this case, the equilibrium unfolds as in part (iii) of Proposition 2.
Part (ii.b) of Proposition 6 shows that λ∗ obtains its minimum as a function of β when
β = ∆. Intuitively, according to Corollary 1, if β < ∆ then the credibility of the board
increases with β. In this region, β and λ substitutes each other. However, if β > ∆ then the
credibility of the board decreases with β, and in this region, β and λ complements each other.
In other words, the least amount of expertise is needed when the credibility of the board is the
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highest, that is, when β = ∆.
4.2. Optimal board bias
The next result characterizes β∗, the optimal level of board bias (given λ).
Proposition 7 Suppose λ ∈ (0, 1]. In equilibrium under the optimal bias (β = β∗), the board is
not influential and target shareholders accept the initial offer irrespective of its recommendation.
Moreover,
(i) If b ≥ b(∆, λ) then β∗ = ∆, and if b < b(∆, λ) then β∗ ∈ (∆,∆ + λ q−q
2
) such that
b (β∗, λ) = b.
(ii) β∗ is increasing in λ.
The closed-form of β∗ is given by expression (74) in the Appendix. According to Proposition
7, the highest shareholder value is obtained in equilibrium when the board is biased against
selling the firm. Consistent with this prediction, Bange and Mazzeo (2004) find that the
takeover premium is higher for targets with non-independent boards, and that if the CEO of
the target is also a board member there is a higher likelihood that the takeover will succeed
and shareholder value will be higher. In both cases, the CEO is likely to use her power over
non-independent directors to resist the takeover and retain her job. Moreover, similar to
Proposition 6, Proposition 7 shows that under the optimal bias, the recommendations of the
board are uninformative and ignored by shareholders in equilibrium.
To understand this result, note that when the board is biased against the takeover, it is
more likely to recommend shareholders to reject the offer. If the board is influential, the bidder
is willing to pay a higher price to avoid a negative recommendation. Therefore, shareholders
can extract more surplus from the bidder if their board is biased against the takeover. A key
question is whether the credibility of the board is diminished by its bias. Without a credible
threat to follow the recommendations of the board and reject lower offers, the bidder has no
incentives to increase the offer above τ (qH). As was shown in Corollary 1, the credibility of
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this threat can increase with the bias of the board as long as β < ∆. Therefore, it is always
optimal to set the bias of the board at least as high as ∆. In this range, a higher bias not only
increases the resistance of the board, but it also increases its credibility. However, if β > ∆
then a trade-off emerges: Higher β implies higher resistance but also lower credibility. Part (i)
of Proposition 7 shows that the optimal bias accounts for this trade-off by setting β∗ to be the
lowest value of β above ∆ that satisfies b(β, λ) ≤ b.
Part (ii) of Proposition 7 shows that β∗ is increasing in λ. Intuitively, if λ is high then
increasing the resistance of the board to the takeover is more important than maintaining its
credibility, which is high in the first place. This observation implies that if the board structure
is optimized along both dimensions, β and λ, it is always optimal to have a fully informed
board! This result is in contrast to Proposition 6, which shows that for a fixed β, λ∗ < 1 can
be optimal. Indeed, as part (ii.b) of Proposition 6 suggests, λ∗ increases in β if and only if
β ≥ ∆. Since β∗ ≥ ∆ for a given λ, it is optimal to choose the highest level of expertise.
Corollary 2 The optimal board structure consists of λ∗ = 1 and β∗ ∈ [∆,∆ + q−q
2
).
4.3. Discussion
Propositions 6 and 7 optimize the board structure along one dimension, while keeping the other
dimension fixed. In reality, the characteristics of board members are likely to be correlated.
For example, boards which are populated with insiders who are either employed by the target
firm or have social or business ties with senior management are likely to be both well informed
(access to management) and biased against selling the firm (protecting the CEO). That is, β
and λ are positively correlated (at least when β > 0). In this respect, Corollary 2 is reassuring
as it suggests that when both dimensions of the board are considered, it is optimal to have a
well informed board that is biased against selling the firm.
Finally, outside the context of takeovers, the bias of the board and its expertise can have
different effects on shareholder value. For example, biasing the board away from maximizing
shareholder value can result with distortions in the investment policy of the firm, which could
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affect its standalone value. In this respect, the analysis does not necessarily suggest that it
is always desirable or feasible to design a board with “optimal bias”and “optimal expertise”
as described by Propositions 6 and 7. Instead, the analysis emphasizes that in the context of
takeovers, the bias and expertise of the target board have significant advantages and disadvan-
tages that were previously overlooked.
5. Concluding remarks
Corporate boards can use their information advantage to alert shareholders when a takeover
offer is inadequate. This paper studies the advisory role of the board of directors in takeovers.
A unique feature of the model is that the ability of the target board to resist a takeover is
endogenous - the board must convince target shareholders that it is in their best interests to
reject the takeover offer. The analysis offers novel predictions about the relationship between
the likelihood that shareholders follow the recommendations of the board and the reaction
of the market to these recommendations, and various characteristics of the acquirer and the
target firm.
In addition, the analysis characterizes the optimal board structure in the context of takeovers.
Under the optimal board structure, directors of the target firm are biased against the takeover.
Perhaps surprisingly, I show that uninformative and ignored recommendations are not neces-
sarily evidence that the target board has no influence on the outcome of the takeover. In fact,
under the optimal board structure, target shareholders accept the takeover offer in equilibrium
irrespective of the recommendations of the board, which are never informative. In other words,
the inability to influence the decision of target shareholders in equilibrium is a robust feature
of an optimal board structure in takeovers.
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A. Appendix - Proofs of main results
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose q̂ (m) + ∆ ≤ p1 for all m ∈ M (p1). Based on Lemma 1,
φ1 (m, p1) = 1 for all m ∈ M (p1). Therefore, according to Definition 1, the equilibrium is not
influential. Suppose p1 < q̂ (m) + ∆ for all m ∈ M (p1). Based on Lemma 1, φ1 (m, p1) = 0
for all m ∈ M (p1). Thus the equilibrium can be influential only if δ > 0. Based on Lemma
2, the bidder always revises the initial offer to q̂ (m) + ∆, if he has the opportunity to do so,
and shareholders accept the revised offer. However, notice that if this is indeed an equilibrium,
the expected payoff of the board is δ (q̂ (m) + ∆) + (1− δ) (E [q̃|s̃] + β) for all m ∈ M (p1).
Therefore, as long as δ > 0 the board has strict incentives to send m ∈ arg maxm∈M(p1) q̂ (m)
regardless of the realization of s̃. This condition implies q̂ (m′) = q̂ (m′′) for all m′ 6= m′′ ∈
M (p1), and hence, the equilibrium is not influential according to Definition 1. Finally, suppose
there are m′ 6= m′′ ∈M (p1) such that
q̂ (m′) + ∆ ≤ p1 < q̂ (m′′) + ∆. (21)
If this condition holds, it requires q̂ (m′) 6= q̂ (m′′). Therefore, according to Lemma 1, φ (m′, p1) =
1 and φ (m′′, p1) = 0, and the equilibrium is influential.
Proof of Proposition 1. First note that parts (i) and (ii) follow from Lemma 1, Lemma
2, and the discussion in the main text that follows Lemma 3 up to Proposition 1. Suppose
there exists an influential equilibrium of the communication subgame. According to Lemma
3 and the discussion that follows this lemma in the main text, the disjoint sets MA (p) and
MR (p) are not empty, and if m ∈ MA (p1) then q̂ (m) + ∆ ≤ p1 and if m ∈ MR (p1) then
p1 < q̂ (m)+∆. Moreover, based on (10) the board prefers sendingm ∈MA (p) overm ∈MR (p)
if and only if τ(s̃) ≤ p1. Since these sets are disjoint, non-empty, and their union is M (p1),
it is necessary that τ(q) < p1 < τ(q). Moreover, the integration over all m ∈ MA (p1) yields
E [q̃|τ(s̃) ≤ p1]+∆ ≤ p1, and the integration over allm ∈MR (p) yields p1 < E [q̃|τ(s̃) > p1]+∆.
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The combination of these two conditions yields
E [q̃|τ(s̃) ≤ p1] + ∆ ≤ p1 < E [q̃|τ(s̃) > p1] + ∆. (22)
Auxiliary Lemma 4 in Appendix B shows that the intersection of τ(q) < p1 < τ(q) and
condition (22) is equivalent to the intersection of τ(q) < p1 and p1 ∈ [τ(qL), τ(qH)), which
proves the argument.
Next, suppose τ(q) < p1 < τ(q) and condition (22) hold. Consider an equilibrium of the
communication subgame in which the board sends message mA if τ(s̃) ≤ p1 and message
mR 6= mA otherwise. Since τ(q) < p1 < τ(q), both messages are on the equilibrium path. Note
that q̂ (mA) = E [q̃|τ(s̃) ≤ p1] and q̂ (mR) = E [q̃|τ(s̃) > p1]. Since (22) holds, q̂ (mA) + ∆ ≤
p1 < q̂ (mR) + ∆, which according to Lemma 3 implies that the equilibrium is influential, as
required.
Proof of Corollary 1. Let κ ≡ λ q−q
2
, I use this notation to ease the exposition throughout
the Appendix. Based on (9) and (13),
τ(qH)− τ(qL) = (2− δ)λ
qH − qL
2
= (2− δ)×
κ+ min{
δ
1−δκ+ β −∆, 0} if β ≤ ∆
κ+ ∆− β if ∆ < β.
(23)
It can be verified that τ(qH)−τ(qL) > 0 if and only if condition (14) holds. Moreover, it follows
directly from the explicit expression of τ(qH) − τ(qL) that it increases in κ, and increases in
β −∆ if and only if β −∆ < 0. Notice that if 0 ≤ δ
1−δκ+ β −∆ then τ(qH)− τ(qL) decreases
in δ. If δ
1−δκ+ β −∆ < 0 then
∂
∂δ
[τ(qH)− τ(qL)] = κ(1−δ)2 − (β −∆) > 0 as required.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose condition (14) holds. I argue the cutoffs in the statement
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are given by
(
b, b
)
=

( max{0, β −∆ + δ
1−δκ} , β −∆ +
2−δ
1−δκ ) if ∆−
κ
1−δ < β ≤ ∆
( β −∆ + δ
1−δκ , (
√
β −∆−
√
2−δ
1−δκ)
2 ) if ∆ < β < ∆ + 1−δ
2−δκ
( ∆−β+κ
1−δ ,
∆−β+κ
1−δ ) if ∆ +
1−δ
2−δκ ≤ β < ∆ + κ
(24)
and recall κ ≡ λ q−q
2
. We start with several observations. First, suppose p1 = τ (x) ∈
[τ(qL), τ(qH)). The board is influential with respect to this offer and the bidder’s expected
profit is
π (x) ≡ Pr [s̃ ≤ x] (E [q̃|s̃ ≤ x] + ∆ + b− τ (x)) + δ Pr [s̃ > x] b (25)
=
x− q
q − q
(
λx+ (1− λ) q + q
2
+ ∆ + b− τ (x)
)
+
q − x
q − q δb.
Second, note that s∗∗ = arg maxx π (x), where s∗∗ is given by (15). Also note that
π (s∗∗) =
1− δ
4κ
(
∆− β − δ
1− δκ+ b
)2
+ δb. (26)
Third, notice that
s∗∗ < qL ⇔ b < y ≡
∣∣∣∣∆− β − δ1− δκ
∣∣∣∣ (27)
s∗∗ < qH ⇔ b < y ≡ − |∆− β|+
2− δ
1− δκ, (28)
where condition (14) implies y < y .
There are two cases to consider. First, suppose ∆ − κ
1−δ < β ≤ ∆. In this case, qH = q
and qL = q + 2λ max{0,∆− β −
δ
1−δκ}. Let Π (τ (x)) be the expected profit of the bidder as a
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function of the initial offer p1 = τ (x). In this case,
Π (τ (x)) =

π(q) = δb if x < qL
π (x) if qL ≤ x ≤ qH
π (qH)− (τ (x)− τ(qH)) if qH < x
(29)
Indeed, if p1 < τ (qL) then p1 < E [q̃] + ∆ and the board is not influential, so the initial offer is
rejected for sure and the bidder’s expected profit is π(q). If τ(qL) ≤ p1 < τ(qH) then board is
influential, and by construction, the expected profit of the bidder is π (x). If τ(qH) ≤ p1 then
E [q̃] + ∆ < p1 and the board is not influential, so the initial offer is accepted for sure by the
shareholders and the bidder’s profit is E [q̃] + ∆ + b− p1. Since qH = q, this can be written as
π (qH) − (τ (x)− τ(qH)). Recall s∗∗ < qL ⇔ b < y and s∗∗ < qH ⇔ b < y. Since qH = q and
π (x) is continuous and concave in x ∈ [qL, q], we have
x∗ ≡ arg max
x∈[q,q]
Π (τ (x)) =

qL if b ≤ y
s∗∗ ∈ (qL, qH) if y < b < y
qH if y ≤ b.
(30)
Therefore b = y. Note that in this region q < qL ⇔ β−∆+ δ1−δκ < 0. I argue b = β−∆+
2−δ
1−δκ
and b = max{0, β−∆+ δ
1−δκ}. Indeed, if β−∆+
δ
1−δκ < 0 then x
∗ ≥ qL > q for all b. Therefore,
the board is influential for all b ∈ [0, y), in which case x∗ = max {s∗∗, qL} and b = 0. However, if
β−∆+ δ
1−δκ ≥ 0 then qL = q. Therefore, if b ≤ y = β−∆+
δ
1−δκ ≥ 0 then the initial offer fails
for sure, and the board is influential if and only if b ∈ (y, y), in which case x∗ = s∗∗ > qL = q
and b = β −∆ + δ
1−δκ.
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Second, suppose ∆ < β < ∆ + κ. In this case, qL = q, qH = q + 2λ (∆− β) < q, and
Π (τ (x)) =
π (x) if q ≤ x < qHE [q̃] + ∆ + b− τ (x) if qH ≤ x (31)
We make several observations. First,
π (qH) < E [q̃] + ∆ + b− τ (qH)⇔ 0 < b. (32)
Second,
π(q) < E [q̃] + ∆ + b− τ (qH)⇔ b > ŷ ≡
∆− β + κ
1− δ > 0. (33)
Third,
π (s∗∗) < E [q] + ∆ + b− τ (qH)⇔ y3 < b < y4 (34)
where
y3 ≡ (
√
β −∆−
√
2− δ
1− δκ)
2 and y4 ≡ (
√
β −∆ +
√
2− δ
1− δκ)
2. (35)
Fourth,
ŷ ≤ y3 < y < y4 (36)
and
β < ∆ +
1− δ
2− δκ⇒ y < ŷ < y3 (37)
β = ∆ +
1− δ
2− δκ⇒ ŷ = y = y3 (38)
β > ∆ +
1− δ
2− δκ⇒ ŷ < y3 < y. (39)
There are two cases:
1. First, if ∆ + 1−δ
2−δκ ≤ β then ŷ ≤ y3 < y < y < y4. Therefore, if b < ŷ then s
∗∗ < q
and E [q̃] + ∆ + b − τ (qH) < π(q), which implies that x = q is the optimal decision of the
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bidder. In this case the board is not influential and the initial offer fails for sure. If ŷ ≤ b then
π(q) ≤ E [q̃] + ∆ + b − τ (qH). Moreover, since b ∈ (y, y) ⇒ b ∈ (y3, y4) then s∗∗ ∈ (q, qH) ⇒
π(s∗∗) < E [q̃] + ∆ + b− τ (qH). This argument implies that x = qH is the optimal decision of
the bidder. In this case, the board is not influential and the initial offer is accepted for sure.
Overall,
x∗ =
q if b < ŷqH if ŷ ≤ b (40)
and b = b = ∆−β+κ
1−δ .
2. Second, if ∆ + 1−δ
2−δκ > β then y < ŷ < y3 < y < y4. Therefore, if b < y then s
∗∗ < q and
E [q̃]+∆+b−τ (qH) < π(q). Therefore, x = q is the optimal decision of the bidder. In this case
the board is not influential and the initial offer fails for sure. If y ≤ b < y3 then s∗∗ ∈ (q, qH)
and E [q̃] + ∆ + b− τ (qH) < π (s∗∗). Therefore, x = s∗∗ is the optimal decision of the bidder.
In this case the board is influential. If y3 ≤ b then either π (s∗∗) ≤ E [q] + ∆ + b − τ (qH) , or
E [q] + ∆ + b − τ (qH) < π (s∗∗) and qH < s∗∗. Since π (qH) < E [q̃] + ∆ + b − τ (qH) always
holds, x = qH is the optimal decision of the bidder. In this case, the board is not influential
and the initial offer is accepted for sure. Overall,
x∗ (b) =

q if b < y
s∗∗ if y ≤ b < y3
qH if y3 ≤ b
(41)
where b = β −∆ + δ
1−δκ and b = (
√
β −∆−
√
2−δ
1−δκ)
2.
Finally, the proof that p∗1 < p
∗
2 if the initial offer is rejected and revised by the bidder on
the equilibrium path, is given by the auxiliary Lemma 5 in Appendix B.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let κ ≡ λ q−q
2
. According to Proposition 2, the following hold:
1. The board is not influential and shareholders accept the initial tender offer if either
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β ≤ ∆ − κ
1−δ , or ∆ −
κ
1−δ < β < ∆ + κ and b ∈
[
b,∞
)
, or ∆ + κ ≤ β. In those cases,
shareholders ignore a recommendation from the board to reject the offer. Denote these
events by ε = i.
2. The board is not influential and shareholders reject the initial tender offer if ∆− δ
1−δκ <
β < ∆ +κ and b ∈ [0, b). In those cases, shareholders ignore a recommendation from the
board to accept the offer. Denote these events by ε = ii.
Suppose that at the outset of the game, each parameter of the model, denoted by θ ∈ Θ ≡
{b, δ, κ, β,∆}, is drawn by nature from a distribution Fθ (where the parameters are subject
to all the constraints I specify in the setup of the model, e.g., ∆ > 0). Suppose also the
parameters of the model are independent of each other. The independence of parameters is
essential for deriving of the comparative statics which by definition requires holding every else
equal. Notice that condition (14) and cutoffs b and b, as given by expression (24) in the proof
of Proposition 2, depend on the value of Θ. Part (i) is a statement about how Pr [ε = i|θ]
changes with θ, where the probability is taken with respect to the joint distribution of Θ\ {θ}.
Similarly, part (ii) is a statement about how Pr [ε = ii|θ] changes with θ.
The comparative statics with respect to b follows directly from the two observations above.
Consider the comparative statics with respect to β. Suppose condition (14) holds. According
to expression (24), b (β) increases with β if and only if β < ∆, and b (β) increases with β if and
only if β < ∆ + 1−δ
2−δκ. This argument concludes the effect of β. The proof of the comparative
statics with respect to κ and δ is more involved and can be found in auxiliary Lemma 6 in
Appendix B.
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Proof of Proposition 4. Notice that H∗∗ > 0 if and only if
p∗∗1 > E [q̃|τ (s̃) > p∗∗1 ] + δ∆⇔
τ(max {qL, s∗∗}) > E [q̃|s̃ > max {qL, s∗∗}] + δ∆⇔ δ (E [q̃|s̃ > max {qL, s∗∗}] + ∆)
+ (1− δ) (E [q̃|s̃ = max {qL, s∗∗}] + β)
 > E [q̃|s̃ > max {qL, s∗∗}] + δ∆⇔
E [q̃|s̃ = max {qL, s∗∗}] + β > E [q̃|s̃ > max {qL, s∗∗}]⇔
λE [q̃|q̃ = max {qL, s∗∗}] + β > λE [q̃|q̃ > max {qL, s∗∗}]⇔
max {qL, s∗∗} > q − 2β/λ (42)
Based on (15) and (13), this condition holds if and only if
max
{
β − κ,∆− κ
1− δ ,
∆ + b+ β
2
− 1
2
2− δ
1− δκ
}
> 0, (43)
and recall κ ≡ λ q−q
2
. The statement follows directly from this expression. In auxiliary Lemma
7 in Appendix B I show that the statement is not empty, that is, there is a configuration of
parameters such that H∗∗ > 0 and a configuration such that H∗∗ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. I prove that if β 6∈ (∆−λ q−q
2
,∆+λ
q−q
2
) then the there is no revised
offer with respect to which the target board is influential. If true, the analysis of Proposition
2 applies in this range. For this purpose, let m1 be the board’s message with respect to initial
offer p1. Also let φ1 (m1, p1) be the resulted decision of target shareholders and p2 (m1) the
revised offer that follows this message if the initial offer is rejected.
Suppose m1 is uninformative about q̃. If the initial offer is revised then the continuation of
the game unfolds as in the baseline model with the exception that δ = 0. Applying Proposition
1 and Corollary 1 for the special case δ = 0, implies that if β 6∈ (∆− λ q−q
2
,∆ + λ
q−q
2
) then the
board can never influence the decision of target shareholders at the continuation of the game.
Suppose m1 is informative about q̃. We proceed in several steps. First, I argue that there
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is s∗ ∈ [q, q] such that if s̃ ≥ s∗ then m1 satisfies φ1 (m1, p1) = 0 and if s̃ < s∗ then m1
satisfies φ1 (m1, p1) = 1. To see why, suppose that the initial offer is rejected. If the bidder
does not revise the initial offer then the board’s payoff is E [q̃|s̃] + β. If the bidder revises the
initial offer and the board is not influential with respect to the revised offer then its payoff
is either p2 (m1) if the revised offer is accepted or E [q̃|s̃] + β if it is rejected. If the bidder
revises the initial offer and the board is influential with respect to the revised offer then the
board’s payoff is max {p2 (m1) ,E [q̃|s̃] + β}. Either way, conditional on message m1 and the
rejection of the initial offer, the board’s payoff, denoted by R (m1, s̃), is strictly increasing in
s̃. If φ1 (m
′
1, p1) = φ1 (m
′′
1, p1) for all m
′
1 6= m′′1 then the board chooses m1 ∈ arg maxm p2 (m),
and therefore, message m1 cannot be informative about q̃, a contradiction. Therefore, there
exist m′1 6= m′′1 such that φ1 (m′1, p1) = 0 and φ1 (m′′1, p1) = 1. The board prefers message m′1
over m′′1 if and only if p1 ≤ R (m′1, s̃). Moreover, since δ > 0, if the board sends message m′1
such that φ1 (m
′
1, p1) = 0, then it has to be that m
′
1 ∈ arg maxm1∈{m:φ1(m,p1)=0}R (m1, s̃). Since
R (m1, s̃) is increasing in s̃, so is maxm1∈{m:φ1(m,p1)=0}R (m1, s̃). Therefore, there is s
∗ ∈ [q, q]
as required.
Second, suppose on the contrary that the board is influential with respect to the revised
offer p2 (m1). The board will send a message that results with an approval if and only if
p2 (m1) ≥ E [q̃|s̃] + β. If p2 (m1) < E [q̃|s̃ = s∗] + β then the board always has incentives to
send a message that leads to the rejection of the revised offer. If p2 (m1) ≥ E [q̃|s̃ = q] + β
then the board always has incentives to send a message that leads to the approval of the
revised offer. In both cases, the board cannot be influential with respect to p2 (m1). Suppose
E [q̃|s̃ = s∗] + β ≤ p2 (m1) < E [q̃|s̃ = q] + β, which is equivalent to
λs∗ + (1− λ)E [q̃] + β ≤ p2 (m1) < λq + (1− λ)E [q̃] + β. (44)
If the board is influential then, similar to the proof of Proposition 1, integration over all (second
round) messages that result with a rejection of the revised offer and all messages that result
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with an approval of the revised offer require
E
[
q̃|s∗ ≤ s̃ < p2 (m1)− (1− λ)E [q̃]− β
λ
]
≤ p2 (m1)−∆ < E
[
q̃|p2 (m1)− (1− λ)E [q̃]− β
λ
≤ s̃
]
,
(45)
which is equivalent to
λs∗ + (1− λ)E [q̃] + 2∆− β ≤ p2 (m1) < λq + (1− λ) [q̃] + 2∆− β. (46)
The intersection of conditions (44) and (46) is non-empty if and only if β ∈ (∆− λ q−s∗
2
,∆ +
λ q−s
∗
2
). However, the combination of s∗ ∈ [q, q] and β 6∈ (∆ − λ q−q
2
,∆ + λ
q−q
2
) implies β 6∈
(∆− λ q−s∗
2
,∆ + λ q−s
∗
2
). Therefore, the board cannot be influential with respect to offer p2, a
contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let κ ≡ λ q−q
2
, and note that according to (9) and (13)
τ (qH) = E [q̃] + δ∆ + κ+ (2− δ) min {0,∆− β}+ (1− δ) β. (47)
Case I: Suppose β ≤ ∆. If β ≤ ∆− κ
1−δ then V (κ) = E [q̃] + ∆, and if ∆−
κ
1−δ < β ≤ ∆ then
V (κ) is given by (16). Based on (47) and Lemma 8 in Appendix B,
V (κ) = E [q̃] + δ∆ +

(1− δ) ∆ if κ
1−δ ≤ ∆− β
κ+ (1− δ) β if ∆− β < κ
1−δ and b ≥ b
ψ2 if ∆− β < κ1−δ <
∆−b−β
δ
and b ∈
[
b, b
)
ψ1 if max{∆− β, ∆−b−βδ } <
κ
1−δ and b ∈
[
b, b
)
0 if ∆− β < κ
1−δ and b < b,
(48)
where ψ1 and ψ2 are given by (103) and (104). Substituting b and b with their explicit form
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as reflected by (24), V (κ) can be rewritten as
V (κ) = E [q̃] + δ∆ +

(1− δ) ∆ if κ
1−δ ≤ ∆− β
κ+ (1− δ) β if ∆− β < κ
1−δ ≤
∆−β+b
2−δ
ψ2 if max{∆− β, ∆−β+b2−δ } <
κ
1−δ < min{
∆−β+b
δ
, ∆−β−b
δ
}
ψ1 if max{∆− β, ∆−β+b2−δ ,
∆−β−b
δ
} < κ
1−δ ≤
∆−β+b
δ
0 if max{∆− β, ∆−β+b
δ
} < κ
1−δ
(49)
Note that max{∆− β, ∆−β−b
δ
} < ∆−β+b
δ
and
∆− β < (>) b
1− δ ⇒
∆− β − b
δ
< (>) ∆− β < (>) ∆− β + b
2− δ (50)
There are two cases to consider. First, if ∆− β < b
1−δ then
V (κ) = E [q̃] + δ∆ +

(1− δ) ∆ if κ
1−δ ≤ ∆− β
κ+ (1− δ) β if ∆− β < κ
1−δ ≤
∆−β+b
2−δ
ψ1 if
∆−β+b
2−δ <
κ
1−δ ≤
∆−β+b
δ
0 if ∆−β+b
δ
< κ
1−δ .
(51)
Note that κ
1−δ = ∆ − β ⇒ κ + (1− δ) β = (1− δ) ∆. Also note that according to Lemma 8,
ψ1 is decreasing in λ in the relevant range, and that if
κ
1−δ =
∆−β+b
2−δ then E [q̃] + δ∆ + κ +
(1− δ) β = ψ1. Therefore, the optimal κ∗ requires κ
∗
1−δ = min{
1
1−δ
q−q
2
, ∆−β+b
2−δ }, which implies
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λ∗ = min{1, ∆−β+b
2−δ
1−δ
q−q
2
}. Second, if ∆− β ≥ b
1−δ then
V (κ) = E [q̃] + δ∆ +

(1− δ) ∆ if κ
1−δ ≤ ∆− β
ψ2 if ∆− β < κ1−δ ≤
∆−β−b
δ
ψ1 if
∆−β−b
δ
< κ
1−δ ≤
∆−β+b
δ
0 if ∆−β+b
δ
< κ
1−δ .
(52)
Note that according to Lemma 8, both ψ1 and ψ2 are decreasing in λ in the relevant range.
Also note that κ
1−δ = ∆ − β ⇒ ψ2 = (1− δ) ∆ and
κ
1−δ =
∆−β−b
δ
⇒ ψ2 = ψ1. Therefore, the
optimal κ∗ requires κ
∗
1−δ = min{
1
1−δ
q−q
2
,∆− β}, which implies λ∗ = min{1, ∆−β
1
1−δ
q−q
2
}.
Case II: Suppose β > ∆. If ∆ + κ ≤ β then V (κ) = E [q̃] + ∆, and if ∆ < β < ∆ + κ then V
is given by (16). Based on (47) and Lemma 8
V (κ) = E [q̃] + δ∆ +

(1− δ) ∆ if κ ≤ β −∆
κ+ (2− δ) ∆− β if β −∆ < κ and b ≥ b
ψ1 if β −∆ < κ and b ∈
[
b, b
)
0 if β −∆ < κ and b < b,
(53)
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where ψ1 is given by (103). Substituting b and b with their explicit form, then
V (κ) = E [q̃]+δ∆+

(1− δ) ∆ if κ ≤ β −∆
κ+ (2− δ) ∆− β
if β −∆ < κ ≤ min{b (1− δ) + β −∆, 2−δ
1−δ (β −∆)}
or 2−δ
1−δ (β −∆) < κ <
1−δ
2−δ (
√
b+
√
β −∆)2
ψ1
if max{β −∆, 2−δ
1−δ (β −∆) ,
1−δ
2−δ (
√
b+
√
β −∆)2} <
κ ≤ (1− δ) ∆−β+b
δ
0
if max{β −∆, b (1− δ) + β −∆} < κ ≤ 2−δ
1−δ (β −∆)
or max{2−δ
1−δ (β −∆) , (1− δ)
∆−β+b
δ
} < κ.
(54)
Note that β −∆ < min{2−δ
1−δ (β −∆) , b (1− δ) + β −∆} and
β−∆
(1−δ)2 < b⇒
2−δ
1−δ (β −∆) < min{(1− δ)
∆−β+b
δ
, 1−δ
2−δ (
√
b+
√
β −∆)2, b (1− δ) + β −∆}
β−∆
(1−δ)2 > b⇒
2−δ
1−δ (β −∆) > max{(1− δ)
∆−β+b
δ
, 1−δ
2−δ (
√
b+
√
β −∆)2, b (1− δ) + β −∆}
(55)
There are two cases to consider. First, if β−∆
(1−δ)2 < b then
V (κ) = E [q̃] + δ∆ +

(1− δ) ∆ if κ ≤ β −∆
κ+ (2− δ) ∆− β if β −∆ < κ < 1−δ
2−δ (
√
b+
√
β −∆)2
ψ1 if
1−δ
2−δ (
√
b+
√
β −∆)2 < κ ≤ (1− δ) ∆−β+b
δ
0 if (1− δ) ∆−β+b
δ
< κ,
(56)
Note that κ = β −∆ ⇒ κ + (1− δ) β > (1− δ) ∆. Also note that according to Lemma 8, ψ1
is decreasing in λ in the relevant range, and that if κ = 1−δ
2−δ (
√
b+
√
β −∆)2 then E [q̃] + δ∆ +
κ + (1− δ) β > ψ1. Therefore, the optimal κ∗ requires κ∗ = min{
q−q
2
, 1−δ
2−δ (
√
b +
√
β −∆)2},
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which implies λ∗ = min{1, (
√
b+
√
β−∆)
2
2−δ
1−δ
q−q
2
}. Second, if β−∆
(1−δ)2 ≥ b then
V (κ) = E [q̃] + δ∆ +

(1− δ) ∆ if κ ≤ β −∆
κ+ (2− δ) ∆− β if β −∆ < κ ≤ b (1− δ) + β −∆
0 if b (1− δ) + β −∆ < κ,
(57)
Here it is straight forward to see that λ∗ = min{1, b(1−δ)+β−∆q−q
2
}.
Summary: Overall, λ∗ = min{1, L∗} where
L∗ =
2 (1− δ)
q − q ×

∆− β if β ≤ ∆− b
1−δ
b+∆−β
2−δ if ∆−
b
1−δ < β ≤ ∆
(
√
b+
√
β−∆)2
2−δ if ∆ < β ≤ ∆ + b (1− δ)
2
b+ β−∆
1−δ if ∆ + b (1− δ)
2 < β.
(58)
The comparative statics that is described in the main text follow directly from the explicit
expression of λ∗. To prove parts (i) and (ii) we consider four subcases.
1. If β 6∈ (∆− 1
1−δ max{
q−q
2
, b},∆ + q−q
2
) then condition (14) is violated for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. If
β ∈ (∆− 1
1−δ
q−q
2
,∆− b
1−δ ) then λ
∗ = ∆−β
1
1−δ
q−q
2
< 1.
2. Suppose β ∈ (∆ − 1
1−δ max{
q−q
2
, b},∆]. In this range, b (λ) = β − ∆ + λ2−δ
1−δ
q−q
2
and
λ∗ = min{1, b+∆−β
2−δ
1−δ
q−q
2
}. Thus, λ∗ < 1 if and only if b < b (β, 1). If b < b (β, 1) then by
construction b = b (β, λ∗) and ∆ − λ∗ 1
1−δ
q−q
2
< β ⇔ ∆ − b
1−δ < β. If b ≥ b (β, 1) then
λ∗ = 1 and clearly ∆− 1
1−δ
q−q
2
< β.
3. Suppose β ∈ (∆,∆ + min{b (1− δ)2 , q−q
2
}). Since β < ∆ + b (1− δ)2 implies β−∆
1−δ
2−δ
q−q
2
<
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(
√
b+
√
β−∆)2
2−δ
1−δ
q−q
2
, β < ∆ + λ∗ 1−δ
2−δ
q−q
2
< ∆ + λ∗
q−q
2
and condition (14) holds. Moreover,
λ∗ < 1⇔ b <
(√
2− δ
1− δ
q − q
2
−
√
β −∆
)2
= b (β, 1) . (59)
If λ∗ = 1 then b ≥ b (β, 1), and if λ∗ < 1 then b = b (β, λ∗), as required.
4. Suppose β ∈ (∆ + b (1− δ)2 ,∆ + q−q
2
). Since β > ∆ + b (1− δ)2 implies β−∆
1−δ
2−δ
q−q
2
>
b(1−δ)+β−∆
q−q
2
, ∆ + λ∗ 1−δ
2−δ
q−q
2
< β < ∆ + λ∗
q−q
2
and condition (14) holds. Moreover,
λ∗ < 1⇔ b <
∆− β + q−q
2
1− δ = b (β, 1) . (60)
If λ∗ = 1 then b ≥ b (β, 1), and if λ∗ < 1 then b = b (β, λ∗).
Proof of Proposition 7. Let κ ≡ λ q−q
2
. If β 6∈ (∆ − κ
1−δ ,∆ + κ) then the board is never
influential and the target shareholder value is E [q̃] + ∆. We show that for any b there is
β ∈ (∆− κ
1−δ ,∆ + κ) that generates a strictly higher expected shareholder value.
Suppose b ≥ 2−δ
1−δκ. Based on (24), b ≥ b for all β. Therefore, according to (16),
V (β) = τ (qH) = λq + (1− λ)
q + q
2
+
2∆− β if ∆ < β < ∆ + κδ∆ + (1− δ) β if ∆− κ
1−δ < β ≤ ∆,
(61)
which obtains its maximum at β = ∆. Since V (∆) > E [q̃] + ∆, β∗ = ∆ as required.
Next, suppose b < 2−δ
1−δκ. Based on based (24), b(∆) =
2−δ
1−δκ, b(∆ + κ) = 0 and b (β) is a
decreasing function of β when β ∈ [∆,∆ + κ]. Therefore, there is β ∈ (∆,∆ + κ) such that
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b(β) = b. Based on (24),
β = ∆ +
κ− (1− δ) b if b <
1
1−δ
1
2−δκ
(
√
2−δ
1−δκ−
√
b)2 if 1
1−δ
1
2−δκ ≤ b <
2−δ
1−δκ
(62)
I argue that if b < 2−δ
1−δκ then β
∗ = β. There are several steps. First, since V
(
β
)
=
τ(qH)|β=β > E [q̃] + ∆, choosing β 6∈ (∆ − κ1−δ ,∆ + κ) is suboptimal. Also, choosing β such
that b < b(β), which yields V = E [q̃] + δ∆, cannot be optimal.
Second, define β̂ < ∆ such that b(β̂) = b. Based on (24),
β̂ = ∆− 2− δ
1− δκ+ b. (63)
Note that β̂ > ∆− κ
1−δ if and only if b > κ. We argue that if κ < b <
2−δ
1−δκ then V
(
β
)
> V (β̂).
If true, choosing β ≤ ∆ such that b ≥ b(β) is never optimal. There are two sub-cases. First, if
max{κ, 1
1−δ
1
2−δκ} < b <
2−δ
1−δκ then V
(
β
)
> V (β̂) if and only if τ(qH)|β=β > τ(qH)|β=β̂, which
holds if and only if
2∆− β > δ∆ + (1− δ) β̂ ⇔
∆−
(√
2− δ
1− δκ−
√
b
)2
> δ∆ + (1− δ)
(
∆− 2− δ
1− δκ+ b
)
⇔
κ− 2
√
κ
√
(2− δ) (1− δ) b+ b (2− δ) (1− δ) < (1− δ)2 κ⇔(√
(2− δ) (1− δ) b−
√
κ
)2
< (1− δ)2 κ⇔
b <
2− δ
1− δκ
which always holds in this range. Second, if κ < b < 1
1−δ
1
2−δκ then V
(
β
)
> V (β̂) if and only if
2∆− β > δ∆ + (1− δ) β̂ ⇔ δ < 1, (64)
53
which always holds, as required.
Third, I show that if b < 2−δ
1−δκ and β is such that b(β) ≤ b < b(β) then V (β, b) < V
(
β, b
)
.
If true, this argument completes the proof that b < 2−δ
1−δκ ⇒ β
∗ = β. Notice that based on
(24), b(β) ≤ b < b(β) implies β < ∆ + 1−δ
2−δκ. Consider two sub-cases:
Case I: Suppose ∆− δ
1−δκ < β < ∆ +
1−δ
2−δκ. In this case, qL < s
∗∗ and V (β) = ψ1 (β) where
ψ1 (β) is given by (103) in Lemma 8. Since b(·) is an increasing function of β in this range,
b(β) ≤ b implies b(∆ − δ
1−δκ) ≤ b. Notice that ψ1 (β) is concave in β and arg maxβ ψ1 (β) =
− δ
1−δκ. Therefore, if b < b(∆−
δ
1−δκ) then
V (∆− δ
1− δκ) = ψ1(∆−
δ
1− δκ) > ψ1 (β) = V (β) (65)
and β ∈ (∆− δ
1−δκ,∆ +
1−δ
2−δκ) is suboptimal. Suppose b(∆−
δ
1−δκ) ≤ b. Since b < b(β), then
β̂ as defined by (63) satisfies b(β̂) = b, ∆− δ
1−δκ ≤ β̂ < β, and V (β̂) = λq+ (1− λ)
q+q
2
+ δ∆ +
(1− δ) β̂ = ψ(β̂). But notice that ψ1(β̂) > ψ1(β) = V (β). We conclude that ∆− δ1−δκ < β <
∆ + 1−δ
2−δκ cannot be optimal.
Case II: Suppose ∆− κ
1−δ < β ≤ ∆−
δ
1−δκ. Note that β in this range can be optimal only if
the following two conditions hold:
1. First, we require
β̂ < − δ
1− δκ⇔ b < 2κ−∆. (66)
Otherwise, since b < b(β) ⇔ β̂ < β, any β̂ < β satisfies − δ
1−δκ < β. Therefore,
ψ1 (β) < ψ1(β̂), but since ψ1(β̂) < V
(
β
)
, choosing β ≤ ∆− δ
1−δκ cannot be optimal.
2. Second, we require
∆− δ
1− δκ− b < −
δ
1− δκ⇔ ∆ < b. (67)
Otherwise, since qL < s∗∗ ⇔ ∆ − δ1−δκ − b < β, qL < s
∗∗ implies − δ
1−δκ < β and
ψ1 (β) < ψ1(∆ − δ1−δκ − b). However, if s
∗∗ ≤ qL then ψ1 (β) = ψ2 (β), where ψ2 (β) is
given by (104). It can be verified that ∆ − κ
1−δ < β implies ψ2 (β) < E [q̃] + ∆. Since
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β = ∆ − δ
1−δκ − b ⇒ s
∗∗ = qL, we have V (∆ − δ1−δκ − b) < E [q̃] + ∆. However, since
E [q̃] + ∆ < V (β), choosing β ≤ ∆− δ
1−δκ cannot be optimal.
The intersection of the two conditions above requires
∆ < b < 2κ−∆, (68)
and note that this condition implies ∆− κ
1−δ < −
δ
1−δκ. If condition (68) holds and b ≤
1
1−δ
1
2−δκ
then ψ1(− δ1−δκ) < V
(
β
)
if and only if
E [q̃] + δ∆ +
1− δ
κ
(∆ + b)2
4
< λq + (1− λ)
q + q
2
+ 2∆− β ⇔ (69)
b < 4κ−∆ (70)
which holds if condition (68) holds. Thus, β is optimal. Suppose condition (68) holds and
1
1−δ
1
2−δκ < b <
2−δ
1−δκ. Since 2κ−∆ <
2−δ
1−δκ, we require
max{∆, 1
1− δ
1
2− δκ} < b < 2κ−∆. (71)
In this range, ψ1(− δ1−δκ) < V
(
β
)
if and only if
E [q̃] + δ∆ +
1− δ
κ
(∆ + b)2
4
< λq + (1− λ)
q + q
2
+ 2∆− β ⇔ (72)
1− δ
κ
(∆ + b)2
4
+
(√
2− δ
1− δκ−
√
b
)2
< κ+ ∆ (1− δ) (73)
Note that the LHS is the convex in b. Therefore, it is suffi cient to check that the inequality
holds at the end-points, that is, when b = 2κ −∆ and when b = 1
1−δ
1
2−δκ. In the latter case,
V
(
β
)
= λq + (1− λ) q+q
2
− ∆ − (κ− b (1− δ)), which we have shown above to be greater
than ψ1(− δ1−δκ), therefore, the inequality holds. If b = 2κ − ∆ then β̂ = −
δ
1−δκ. Therefore,
ψ(− δ
1−δκ) = ψ1(β̂) = λq + (1− λ)
q+q
2
+ δ∆ + (1− δ) β̂ < V
(
β
)
. In both cases, β is optimal,
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as required.
Summary: Overall
β∗ = ∆ +

κ− (1− δ) b if b < 1
1−δ
1
2−δκ
(
√
2−δ
1−δκ−
√
b)2 if 1
1−δ
1
2−δκ ≤ b <
2−δ
1−δκ
0 if 2−δ
1−δκ ≤ b.
(74)
The comparative statics of β∗ follows directly from (74).
Proof of Corollary 2. According to the proof of Proposition 6, if β = β∗ then V = τ (qH) =
κ+ E [q̃] + 2∆− β∗, where κ = λ q−q
2
. Since β∗ increases in κ, shareholder value is maximized
by λ = 1.
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